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When originally elaborated by the Fourth Circuit in Proud v. Stone, 
the same-actor doctrine applied only when an “employee was hired 
and fired by the same person within a relatively short time span.” In 
the two decades since, the doctrine has widened and broadened in 
scope. It now subsumes many employment contexts well beyond 
hiring and firing, to scenarios in which the “same person” entails 
different groups of decision makers, and the “short time span” has 
been elastically extended over seven years. Per the same-actor 
doctrine, when a supervisor first behaves in a way that benefits an 
employee and then subsequently takes adverse action against that 
employee, many federal courts conclude that the supervisor’s adverse 
treatment is presumptively nondiscriminatory, adopting the strong 
inference that the supervisor’s negative employment decision was not 
motivated by bias.  
This Article concludes that this doctrine should be curtailed. 
Given the dearth of textual support and legislative history supporting 
the creation of the same-actor doctrine, the striking growth rate of 
this unjust doctrine in circuits that apply the strong-inference 
standard, and the psychological science amassed that powerfully 
reveals the errors laden within the doctrine, federal courts should 
reevaluate their existing jurisprudence on the same-actor inference. 
Ultimately, this Article recommends that federal courts resolve the 
existing circuit split by adopting the approach of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fundamentally, same-actor evidence 
should be one evidentiary datum for the ultimate trier of fact to weigh 
along with all other possible evidence of discrimination.  
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Aversive racists recognize prejudice is bad, but they do not recognize 
that they are prejudiced. . . . Like a virus that has mutated, racism has 
also evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to 
recognize but also to combat. 
––John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges 
of Aversive Racism1 
 
[E]stablishing one’s lack of prejudice, even with a token gesture like 
choosing the best-qualified candidate who happens to be a member of 
a minority group, licenses individuals to express otherwise dubious 
preferences, such as those that favor Whites over minorities. 
––Anna C. Merritt, Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Moral Self-
Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad2  
 
 
 1. In CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3, 25 (Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998).  
 2. 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344, 346 (2010). 
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The measure of a “rule,” the measure of a right [to be free from 
unlawful bias in the workplace], becomes what can be done about the 
situation. Accurate statements of a “real rule” or of a right [to be free 
from discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, and sex] includes all procedural limitations 
on what can be done about the situation. 
––Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step3  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past half century, the field of social psychology has amassed vast 
scientific knowledge on how stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination 
manifest and operate in the modern day.4 Psychological science has powerfully 
demonstrated that discrimination against members of many stereotyped groups 
has mutated from overt “old-fashioned racism” into new forms of bias that are 
more difficult to directly detect and observe, but are no less pernicious, 
pervasive, and systematically unjust.5 This psychological science has revealed 
that many well-intentioned people believe themselves to be egalitarian and 
unbiased, yet many of these well-intentioned people are affected by societal 
stereotypes, negative racial sentiments, and implicit bias.6 This scientific 
knowledge, moreover, underscores two profound insights: First, psychological 
science has shown the extent to which social contexts, situations, structures, 
and institutions significantly shape how bias is expressed.7 Second, 
discrimination has evolved from primarily an intergroup phenomenon (e.g., 
discrimination turning on employers preferring white over black employees) to 
both an intergroup phenomenon and a within-category problem (e.g., 
 
 3.  30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 448 (1930). 
 4. John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 829 (2001); Jason A. Nier & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Challenge of Detecting Contemporary 
Forms of Discrimination, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 207 (2012); see infra Part II. 
 5. See Dovidio, supra note 4; Nier & Gaertner, supra note 4. 
 6. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1084 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, 
and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364–67 (Daniel T. Gilbert et 
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); infra Part II.A. 
 7. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112; Alice H. Eagly & Amanda B. Diekman, 
What Is the Problem? Prejudice as an Attitude-in-Context, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY 
YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 19 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. 
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate 
Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1039 (2006) (“One of the most important insights emerging from 
social psychology in the past fifty years is the principle that situations, along with one’s subjective 
construal of those situations and one’s attempt to negotiate the conflicting pressures they impose, exert 
a far more powerful effect on people’s behavior than the ‘intuitive psychologist’ generally assumes.”); 
infra Part II.A. 
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discrimination turning on employers preferring less stereotypic or less racially 
salient employees).8 
Despite this vast scientific knowledge, many federal courts today 
elaborate an antidiscrimination jurisprudence that imposes on claimants 
evidentiary burdens which reflect the belief that discrimination against 
members of stigmatized groups necessarily manifests as old-fashioned, blatant 
prejudice.9 This worldview is in marked tension with the best scientific 
evidence available on how discrimination, in fact, operates in American society 
against stigmatized groups. As a consequence, the startling and widening 
societal disparities in education, employment, housing, and criminal justice 
between groups on account of their race, sex, and/or national origin fall farther 
and farther beyond reach of existing federal antidiscrimination laws.10 
One of the most egregious examples of the epistemological and material 
tension between federal employment discrimination law and psychological 
science is the doctrine known as the same-actor inference of 
nondiscrimination.11 When originally elaborated by the Fourth Circuit in Proud 
v. Stone, the doctrine applied only when an “employee was hired and fired by 
the same person within a relatively short time span.”12 In the two decades 
since, the doctrine has widened and broadened in scope. The same-actor 
inference of nondiscrimination now extends to many employment contexts 
beyond hiring and firing,13 to scenarios in which the “same person” entails 
 
 8. See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN 
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013); Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features 
in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674 (2004); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking 
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Jennifer S. Pratt-Hyatt, Distributing Prejudice 
Unequally: Do Whites Direct Their Prejudice Toward Strongly Identified Minorities?, 96 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432 (2009); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Clara L. Wilkins, Group 
Identification and Prejudice: Theoretical and Empirical Advances and Implications, 66 J. SOC. ISSUES 
461, 462, 465 (2010); Andrew M. Penner & Aliya Saperstein, Engendering Racial Perceptions: An 
Intersectional Analysis of How Social Status Shapes Race, 27 GENDER & SOC’Y 319 (2013). 
 9. See Nier & Gaertner, supra note 4, at 215; Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race 
Empiricism: A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013); Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Alan D. 
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1977).  
 10. See Quintanilla, supra note 9, at 214–15; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. 
REV. 363 (1992).  
 11. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991); infra Part I.A; see, e.g., Brown v. CSC 
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case); 
EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII race 
discrimination case); infra Part II.A. 
 12. Proud, 945 F.2d at 798; infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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groups of decision makers who make employment decisions,14 and the “short 
time span” has been elastically extended to over seven years.15 
While the outer boundaries of the doctrine are both nebulous and in flux, 
the same-actor inference may be applicable when the same actor has taken both 
a positive and adverse employment action toward a claimant who brings an 
employment discrimination suit.16 Per the same-actor doctrine, when a 
supervisor first behaves in a way that benefits an employee and then 
subsequently takes adverse employment action against that employee, many 
federal courts conclude that the supervisor’s adverse treatment of the employee 
is presumptively nondiscriminatory, adopting the strong inference that the 
supervisor’s negative employment decision was not motivated by bias. This 
strong inference of nondiscrimination is said to be legally justifiable on 
grounds of “common sense” about how humans behave and economic 
rationality. 
As we will discuss, these justifications are troubling and, on close 
examination, fail to support the judicial creation of the same-actor doctrine.17 
Indeed, the implicit behavioral theories underpinning the same-actor doctrine 
have been discredited by decades of psychological science on aversive racism, 
implicit bias, and moral licensing.18 Yet the doctrine continues to deprive 
claimants of access to justice in cases in which discrimination, in fact, may 
have deprived them of equal and fair employment opportunity. As originally 
designed, moreover, the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination applied in a 
narrow subset of employment discrimination cases. However, given the 
growth, breadth, drift, and ambiguity of the doctrine’s boundaries, along with 
the centralization of human resources (HR) functions in most employment 
settings, the strong inference of nondiscrimination, if left unchecked, may one 
day license bias in a much broader swath of employment matters.19 
Further, the doctrine grants employers a decisive defense against claims 
of discrimination in a context in which psychological science reveals that 
employers will behave as if they are morally licensed to discriminate. For 
example, some members of the public point to having a black friend or to 
having voted for President Barack Obama as moral credentials of 
egalitarianism––credentials that absolve them of conduct that could be 
 
 14. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. For an excellent discussion of the dynamics of legal endogeneity in the Equal Employment 
Opportunity context, see Lauren B. Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil 
Rights, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 337 
(Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005). 
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perceived as racist.20 So too, in the employment context, employers point to 
having hired a female or black employee as a moral credential to absolve them 
of charges that they have engaged in sex or racial discrimination.21 
Troublingly, the same-actor doctrine materially reifies and reinforces the 
psychological effect of this moral credential and, in turn, increases the 
likelihood that the moral licensing that follows will result in discrimination.  
By providing employers with a virtually irrebuttable defense to charges of 
discrimination in this context, the same-actor doctrine converts this moral 
credential into a legal privilege to engage in bias, thus licensing workplace 
discrimination.22 Finally, insofar as the doctrine presumes that Title VII 
prohibits only overt animus by “old-fashioned racists,” the doctrine 
impermissibly denies the central purpose of Title VII, which was enacted to 
eradicate discriminatory behavior within the employment sector of the U.S. 
economy.23 
Two hypothetical examples of employees who challenge disparate 
treatment and claim that their employers have unlawfully discriminated against 
them will help explain this phenomenon. In the first, Betty is a white female24 
computer programmer who works for a technology company in Silicon Valley. 
Her manager, Mike, is in charge of personnel decisions and hired her three 
years ago. During Betty’s tenure at the technology company, she worked 
steadfastly at the company, earning praise and consistent positive annual 
reviews. As a result, Betty applied for a promotion to a supervisory position. 
The technology company has very few women in supervisory positions. 
However, Mike ultimately chose to promote Carl as a supervisor, even though 
Carl was technically less qualified, because of Mike’s belief that Carl will 
better lead a team of computer programmers. 
In this scenario, many federal courts would apply the same-actor doctrine 
and adopt a strong inference of nondiscrimination in favor of Mike against 
 
 20. See Daniel A. Effron et al., Endorsing Obama Licenses Favoring Whites, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (2009). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001); infra Part II.C. 
 23. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2521 (2015). 
 24. While we refer to Betty as a woman, we recognize that biological sex and gender 
performances are distinct constructs. For instance, while Betty is assumed to be a woman, she could 
be, for example, biologically male and self-present her gender as female. See Joy L. Johnson & Robin 
Repta, Sex and Gender: Beyond the Binaries, in DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING GENDER, SEX, AND 
HEALTH RESEARCH 17 (John L. Oliffe & Lorraine Greaves eds., 2012); Candace West & Don H. 
Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125 (1987). Moreover, while we refer to Betty as a 
white female programmer, we appreciate that people from many different racial and ethnic groups are 
computer programmers, see #YESWECODE, http://www.yeswecode.org [perma.cc/HX6P-J4JR] (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2015), and that Black female programmers experience distinct intersectional barriers in 
the workplace, see BLACK GIRLS CODE, http://www.blackgirlscode.com [perma.cc/8BZ2-LSZC] (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2015).   
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Betty. Because Mike is the manager who hired Betty as a computer 
programmer, federal courts will presumptively deem Mike’s decision not to 
promote Betty to a supervisory position nondiscriminatory. Per the same-actor 
doctrine, unless Betty can produce compelling evidence of sex discrimination 
to dispel the strong inference of nondiscrimination—often requiring direct 
evidence of discrimination—a federal court will grant summary judgment in 
favor of the technology company and dismiss Betty’s case. As this example 
suggests,25 the same-actor inference is in marked tension with sociological 
evidence of the glass ceiling that hinders the advancement of women in 
American workplaces,26 including in fields such as science, technology, 
engineering, math,27 and computer programming in particular.28 
 
 25. While this example is harnessed for illustration, we developed this example by weaving 
the troubling accounts reported in several U.S. Court of Appeals decisions. Cf. Philbrick v. Holder, 
583 F. App’x 478 (6th Cir. 2014); Peters v. Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 31 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Richmond v. Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *1 
(6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1997); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. 
Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 26. Manuela Barreto et al., Introduction: Is the Glass Ceiling Still Relevant in the 21st 
Century?, in THE GLASS CEILING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: UNDERSTANDING BARRIERS TO GENDER 
EQUALITY 3 (Manuela Barreto et al. eds., 2009); VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (MIT Press 1998); GENDER AND OCCUPATIONAL OUTCOMES: 
LONGITUDINAL ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES (Helen M.G. 
Watt & Jacquelynne S. Eccles eds., 2008). 
 27. Beatriz Chu Clewell & Patricia B. Campbell, Taking Stock, Where We’ve Been, Where We 
Are, Where We’re Going, 8 J. WOMEN & MINORITIES SCI. & ENGINEERING 255 (2002); Janet S. Hyde 
et al., Gender Similarities Characterize Math Performance, 321 SCIENCE 494 (2008); Mary C. 
Murphy et al., Signaling Threat: How Situational Cues Affect Women in Math, Science, and 
Engineering Settings, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 879 (2007). See generally CHRISTINE HILL, CHRISTIANNE 
CORBETT & ANDRESSE ST. ROSE, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (2010), http://www.aauw.org/learn/research 
/whysofew.cfm [perma.cc/455R-F6MW]; ANNE E. PRESTON, LEAVING SCIENCE: OCCUPATIONAL 
EXIT FROM SCIENTIFIC CAREERS (2004); Claude M. Steele et al., Contending with Group Image: The 
Psychology of Stereotype and Social Identity Threat, in 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 379 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WOMEN 
AND GIRLS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATH (STEM) (June 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/stem_factsheet_2013_07232013.pdf 
[perma.cc/47FL-V48Q]; VIVAN GORNICK, WOMEN IN SCIENCE: THEN AND NOW (Feminist Press 
2009); EILEEN POLLACK, THE ONLY WOMEN IN THE ROOM: WHY SCIENCE IS STILL A BOY’S CLUB 
(Beacon Press 2015). 
 28. One of the most up-to-date and granular datasets publicly available on gender disparities in 
computer programming has been compiled by Tracy Chou, a female computer programmer. See 
Women-in-Software-Eng, GITHUB, https://github.com/triketora/women-in-software-eng [perma.cc/ 
9UVS-PWGR] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).  The spreadsheet synthesizes business-level data and 
reveals gender disparities among software engineers. WOMEN IN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING STATS, 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1BxbEifUr1z6HwY2_IcExQwUpKPRZY3FZ4x4ZFzZU-
5E/edit?usp=sharing [perma.cc/LYS5-RHWT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).  The spreadsheet reveals, 
for example, that the percentage of female engineers at Dropbox is 10.94 percent, Airbnb is 13.52 
percent, Yelp is 8.25 percent, and PayPal is 6.75 percent. The National Center for Women and 
Information Technology assembles industry-level statistics on the number of women and minorities in 
computer science. See NAT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN & INFO. TECH., BY THE NUMBERS (2014), 
http://www.ncwit.org/sites/default/files/legacy/pdf/BytheNumbers09.pdf [perma.cc/WRB5-G9NB].  
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In the second example, Jason is a black male employee of a logistics 
company in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Mike, the manager in charge of personnel 
decisions, hired Jason three years ago, a period during which Jason worked 
steadfastly at the company, receiving above-average annual reviews. In the 
third year, Mike hired a new supervisor, Dan, who is white, and who began 
overseeing Jason’s day-to-day affairs. Difficulties then began; Dan cited Jason 
a number of times for a lack of productivity, which Jason felt was unjustified, 
especially because Jason was working at the same pace as his coworkers. 
Although Jason complains to Mike about Dan’s conduct, Mike ultimately fires 
Jason after several incident reports. 
Here too, because Mike is the same person who ultimately hired and fired 
Jason, many federal courts will apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination, 
deeming Mike’s decision to fire Jason presumptively unbiased. Unless Jason 
can produce direct evidence of racial discrimination that wards off the strong 
inference of nondiscrimination, federal courts will grant summary judgment 
and dismiss Jason’s case; the trier of fact will never address whether prejudice 
animated Mike and Dan’s behavior.29 As the second example reveals, the 
same-actor inference is in marked tension with the reality of how bias 
manifests in modern American workplaces against members of stereotyped 
groups. 
In this Article, we introduce psychological science that speaks directly to 
how bias operates in modern American workplaces so as to evaluate the same-
actor inference. A paramount insight is that social contexts, situations, 
structures, and institutions powerfully shape whether and how bias is expressed 
against members of stereotyped groups.30 Interpersonal and intergroup contexts 
and situations shape the degree to which—in addition to when, where, and 
how—bias manifests.31 In addition to rooting out “old-fashioned racists,” a 
behaviorally realistic antidiscrimination law would target the situations within 
American workplaces that foment and fuel the manifestation of societal 
stereotypes, negative racial sentiments, and implicit bias against members of 
stereotyped groups. 
One such situation—a context that directly informs the continued 
application of the same-actor inference—can be derived from psychological 
science on moral credentials and moral licensing.32 In the main, people feel 
 
 29. For a case illustrating the dynamics of this example, see Ako-Doffou v. Univ. of Tex., No. 
02-51287, 2003 WL 21417478 (5th Cir. June 3, 2003). For a case that suggests a more sensible way to 
resolve this scenario, see Coburn v. PN II, Inc., 372 F. App’x 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 30. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Pinter & Martin Ltd. 2011) (1991); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112; 
Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7; Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Situated Cognition, in THE 
MIND IN CONTEXT 126 (Batja Mesquita et al. eds., 2010); see infra Part II. 
 31. Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7. 
 32. See Anna C. Merritt et al., Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad, 4 
SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344 (2010); Dale T. Miller & Daniel A. Effron, 
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more comfortable behaving in biased (nonegalitarian) ways when they can 
point to evidence that demonstrates their previous lack of bias.33 After making 
a decision that favors a stereotyped group member, most majority group 
members are less concerned with continuing to appear and behave in 
egalitarian and unbiased ways. As a result, a subsequent decision about a 
member of a stereotyped group is more likely to express bias when it follows 
an initial unbiased decision that serves as a moral credential than when the 
subsequent decision does not. This psychological science on moral credentials 
and moral licensing, therefore, illuminates situations in which implicit bias may 
result in workplace discrimination. 
Troublingly, the U.S. Courts of Appeals that apply a strong inference of 
nondiscrimination per the same-actor doctrine have the matter scientifically in 
reverse. Psychological science on moral licensing reveals that, when a person 
makes both an initial positive employment decision and a subsequent negative 
employment decision against a member of a protected group, the second 
negative decision is more likely to have resulted from bias, not less.34 That is, 
federal courts should be more vigilant to the possibility of discrimination in the 
same-actor context, rather than less. Supervisors often behave as if hiring a 
member of a protected group provides them with a moral credential of being 
bias free, which inhibits their egalitarianism when making other decisions that 
affect that employee. As such, these U.S. Courts of Appeals have developed an 
interstitial doctrine that is behaviorally unrealistic and inconsistent with how 
humans actually behave. The same-actor doctrine enacts a strong inference of 
nondiscrimination in situations in which psychological science cautions that 
discrimination is even more likely to operate unjustly. 
In marked contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
cautioned, criticized, and ultimately curtailed application of the same-actor 
inference.35 The Seventh Circuit has adopted the most appropriate 
jurisprudential approach, one that leaves weighing same-actor evidence—along 
with all other circumstantial evidence—for the trier of fact to reach a lawful 
decision on the merits. In brief, the same-actor situation should not be deemed 
circumstantial evidence in favor or against discrimination; rather, same-actor 
 
Psychological License: When It Is Needed and How It Functions, in 43 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 2010). 
 33. Jill C. Bradley-Geist et al., Moral Credentialing by Association: The Importance of Choice 
and Relationship Closeness, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1564 (2010); Effron et al., 
supra note 20; Daniel A Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads Not Taken: The Licensing Effect of 
Immoral Counterfactual Behaviors, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 916 (2012); Daniel A. 
Effron, Making Mountains of Morality from Molehills of Virtue: Threat Causes People to 
Overestimate Their Moral Credentials, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 972 (2014); Nikki 
H. Mann & Kerry Kawakami, The Long, Steep Path to Equality: Progressing on Egalitarian Goals, 
141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187 (2012); Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
 34. Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
 35. See Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); Williams v. Vitro. Servs. 
Corp., 144 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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evidence should be left for the trier of fact to weigh with all other evidence of 
prejudice. Our primary recommendation is that the Seventh Circuit should be 
justly lauded and rightly followed. This recommendation flows directly from 
an empirical study of the growth rate in the application of the same-actor 
doctrine at summary judgment we report in this Article. We find that the 
growth rate in the application of the doctrine at summary judgment has risen 
and that the growth rate among circuits differs markedly.36 Problematically, 
these growth models predict that, unless the doctrine is curtailed, the growth 
rate of this unjust doctrine will rise greater still.37 
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I introduces psychological 
science on prejudice, aversive racism, and moral licensing, first discussing 
three waves of psychological science on prejudice, then psychological science 
on aversive racism and the importance of a situational understanding of bias, 
and finally to moral licensing literature. Part II turns to the same-actor 
inference, first discussing the origins, justifications, and scope of the doctrine 
and turning next to its evolution and permutations. Part III then reports our 
empirical analyses on the same-actor inference, revealing the doctrine’s 
troubling and differential growth across circuits. Part IV offers our conclusions 
and recommendations. In Part IV, we also highlight epistemological tension 
between the flawed assumptions of the same-actor inference and the best 
scientific evidence available. We then turn to a more nuanced understanding of 
how moral licensing operates in modern workplaces, discuss the lack of a 
legitimate and neutral rationale for the same-actor doctrine, and end with our 
recommendations for curbing the doctrine’s growth. Finally, we conclude with 
additional insights that synthesize our jurisprudential recommendations. 
I. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE ON PREJUDICE, AVERSIVE RACISM, AND MORAL 
LICENSING 
We first turn to psychological science on prejudice, aversive racism, and 
moral licensing, elaborating a body of knowledge in the psychological and 
behavioral sciences that has accumulated over the past half century. First, we 
describe three historical waves of psychological science to underscore how 
prejudice has evolved from a primarily blatant and overt phenomenon to 
encompass less blatant and more complex forms. Second, we introduce 
research on aversive racism, thereby illuminating the importance of a 
situational approach to understanding when bias manifests. Last, we turn to a 
particular situation, mainly moral licensing, a context in which actions are 
perceived as providing moral credentials that, in turn, license and lead to 
discrimination. 
 
 36. See Figs.1 & 2 in Section III.B. 
 37. See text following Fig.2 in Section III.B. 
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A. Three Historical Waves of Psychological Science on Prejudice and 
Discrimination 
Over the past century, scientific study of prejudice has progressed in three 
waves.38 From the 1920s through the 1950s, psychologists in the first wave 
conceived of prejudice as a form of psychopathology. They considered racism 
to be a dangerous and abnormal deviation from normal tendencies, rather than 
a disruption in normal thinking.39 By way of one of our introductory examples, 
in the first wave, researchers would have been primarily concerned with 
whether Jason’s manager, Mike, and his supervisor, Dan, were racist—whether 
Mike and Dan espoused “old-fashioned” blatant racism against black 
employees. If so, Mike and Dan would have been deemed bad apples who 
acted out of a psychopathology. 
In the 1950s through the 1980s, psychologists in the second wave 
reconceptualized prejudice as widespread and rooted in normal rather than 
abnormal thought processes.40 Gordon Allport’s profound insights epitomized 
the views of this second wave.41 Focus shifted from prejudice as a 
psychopathology to how normal cognitive and socialization processes influence 
the manifestation of prejudice.42 Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination 
were reconceived as the result of cognitive processes—social cognition and 
social categorization—associated with classifying social information.43 For 
example, in the second wave, researchers may have investigated whether Dan 
exhibited a greater propensity to construe Jason’s behavior as inadequate 
compared to white employees; that is, stereotypes and schemas about black 
employees may have shaped Dan’s attributions about Jason’s performance. 
 
 38. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830–33. In presenting this brief history of the field’s study of 
racial prejudice, I draw a distinction between the history of studying the causes and consequences of 
racial prejudice and the history of psychologizing racial differences. For an excellent account of the 
latter history, see generally DEFINING DIFFERENCE: RACE AND RACISM IN THE HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY (Andrew S. Winston ed., 2004). 
 39. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830; John Harding & Russell Hogrefe, Attitudes of White 
Department Store Employees Toward Negro Coworkers, 8 J. SOC. ISSUES 18, 18–28 (1952). For a 
discussion on prejudice and ethnic relations, see G.M. Gilbert, Stereotype Persistence and Change 
Among College Students, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245 (1951); Daniel Katz & Kenneth 
Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 280 
(1933). 
 40. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7, at 17–27; Thomas F. 
Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National 
Comparison, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 29 (1958). 
 41. See Gordon W. Allport, Prejudice and the Individual, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO 
REFERENCE BOOK 706, 707, 710 (John P. Davis ed., 1966) (“Research suggests that perhaps 80 
percent of the American people harbor ethnic prejudice of some type and in some appreciable 
degree. . . . With the aid of aversive categories [many] avoid the painful task of dealing with 
individuals as individuals. Prejudice is thus an economical mode of thought, and is widely embraced 
for this very reason.”). 
 42. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Pettigrew, supra note 40, at 29. 
 43. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 831; Fiske, supra note 6, at 357 (“On the cusp of the twenty-
first century, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have not abated.”). 
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Moreover, while Mike chose not to investigate Jason’s complaints, Mike may 
have more closely investigated complaints brought by in-group members 
against a supervisor belonging to an out-group. 
In the 1990s, psychologists in the third wave harnessed sophisticated new 
technologies to study implicit processes that were once theorized but not 
directly measured.44 These new technologies measure implicit associations—
that is, implicit bias and automatic and unconscious attitudes and beliefs.45 
While explicit measures of prejudice rely on self-reports, implicit measures 
draw on a variety of psychological measures, including response latency 
measures of association (such as the Implicit Association Test), physiological 
responses, nonverbal behavior, word-fragment completion, linguistic cues,  and 
fMRI imaging.46 These new methods enabled social psychologists to assess 
individual differences in implicit and explicit attitudes and helped to identify 
those who explicitly adopt egalitarian values, but who nonetheless are 
influenced by stereotypes and implicit bias.47 These psychological scientists 
also investigated when, how, and why intergroup contexts and situations 
influence the manifestation of bias48—a fundamental insight, social contexts 
and situations powerfully influence the expression of prejudice and implicit 
bias.49 In the third wave, researchers would have shifted attention to new 
methods to reveal discrepancies between Mike’s and Dan’s explicit self-
presentations of egalitarianism and their implicit attitudes against black 
employees and in favor of white employees. While the second wave theorized a 
distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes, researchers in the third wave 
may have directly measured this disassociation using sophisticated methods. 
Using these methods, researchers may have studied whether Mike and Dan 
self-identify as egalitarian but nonetheless hold implicit biases against black 
employees, and if so, whether and how various social contexts, structures, and 
institutions within the workplace allow this bias to manifest. 
B. Aversive Racism and a Situational Understanding of Bias 
Aversive racism rests on a contradiction between explicit and implicit 
attitudes.50 This form of modern prejudice characterizes the racial attitudes of 
 
 44. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 832. 
 45. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1084; Fiske, supra note 6. 
 46. See John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1086; Dovidio, 
supra note 4, at 838; Wendy Berry Mendes et al., Challenge and Threat During Social Interactions 
with White and Black Men, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 939 (2002). 
 47. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 835. 
 48. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6, at 1112. 
 49. See id.; Eagly & Diekman, supra note 7. 
 50. See SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 13–14 (2000); B. Keith Payne & C. Daryl Cameron, Divided 
Minds, Divided Morals: How Implicit Social Cognition Underpins and Undermines Our Sense of 
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many well-intentioned people who possess strong egalitarian values and 
believe themselves to be nonprejudiced but who nonetheless hold negative 
racial feelings and stereotypes.51 For aversive racists, implicit bias coexists 
with egalitarian beliefs and the denial of personal prejudice. John Dovidio and 
his colleagues refer to this modern form of prejudice as “aversive” for two 
reasons: First, rather than manifesting open antagonism, many majority-group 
members feel anxiety toward minority-group members, which leads them to 
avoid interracial interactions.52 Second, because aversive racists adhere to 
egalitarian principles, they find the thought that they are prejudiced disquieting 
and disturbing.53 
Over the past decades, social psychologists have revealed that situations 
shape and influence the expression of implicit bias.54 Aversive racists aspire to 
be nonprejudiced. They do not discriminate against minority-group members in 
situations with strong egalitarian norms, where discrimination would be 
obvious to others and themselves.55 In these conditions, aversive racists avoid 
feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that would be associated with bias. Yet aversive 
racists express bias subtly and in ways that can be rationalized under conditions 
of situational ambiguity—when norms are unclear, when situations are 
ambiguous, when the correct choice is uncertain—then bias against minority-
group members can be rationalized on some factor other than race.56 In these 
situations, aversive racists may discriminate against minority-group members 
in ways that allow them to maintain a nonprejudiced self-concept.57 
A robust body of social-psychological research has investigated these 
phenomena. Many studies examine employment situations in which majority-
group members exhibit in-group preferences in favor of majority-group 
 
Social Justice, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND 
APPLICATIONS 445 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 2010). 
 51. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315–16 (2000); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6; Payne & 
Cameron, supra note 50. 
 52. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, When Good People Do Bad Things: The 
Nature of Contemporary Racism, in COVERT RACISM 111, 113 (Rodney D. Coates ed., 2011); 
Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does Not Pay: Effects of Interracial 
Contact on Executive Function, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2003). 
 53. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 52, at 111–20. 
 54. See, e.g., Laura G. Babbitt & Samuel R. Sommers, Framing Matters: Contextual 
Influences on Interracial Interaction Outcomes, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1233 
(2011); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1039–40; Richeson & Shelton, supra note 52. 
 55. See Christopher L. Aberson & Tara E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm and 
Responses Favoring African Americans: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 SOC. 
JUST. RES. 25, 42–43 (2004). 
 56. See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 316–18. 
 57. See James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of 
Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995). 
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members while withholding assistance to minority-group members.58 In these 
studies, decisions are affected by stereotypes, social cognition, and implicit 
bias, resulting in disparate treatment toward minority-group members.59 
Nevertheless, this bias is rationalized after the fact: subjective decision-making 
criteria change, standards subtly shift, and the weight accorded to this decision-
making criterion varies depending on whether the decision is about an in-group 
versus an out-group member.60 
This important research reveals the fallacy of equating all prejudice 
against members of stereotyped groups as a “taste” or “preference” for 
discrimination.61 Unfortunately, some scholars have analogized the 
psychological discomfort experienced toward members of different groups as a 
taste for race or sex discrimination.62 Yet, decades of psychological science 
have revealed that, while many members of the American public experience 
aversion toward different groups (e.g., anxiety and uneasiness leading to 
awkwardness or avoidance), because members of the public simultaneously 
endorse egalitarian beliefs, the very thought that one could be prejudiced is 
aversive.63 Moreover, in contrast to blatant dislike of an out-group, aversive 
racism may entail a strong favoring of one’s in-group, which nevertheless 
results in disparate treatment and outcomes.64 For example, within the 
workplace, majority group members may be more willing to share valuable 
information about employment opportunities with other majority group 
members, rather than stereotyped group members. As such, characterizing all 
prejudice as a taste for racism or sexism is at best error, and at worst, a botched 
metaphor that distracts attention to bias as depicted in the first wave of 
psychological research—psychopathology—rather than more modern, 
complex, and pervasive forms of the psychological phenomenon. 
C. Psychological Science on Moral Credentials and Moral Licensing 
Psychological science on moral credentials and moral licensing 
demonstrates that people are more likely to act in ethically questionable ways 
when they can point to evidence that they have a virtuous character.65 For 
 
 58. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in 36 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 16 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2004); see also Michael I. Norton et 
al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 820–22 (2004). 
 59. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 58; see also Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in 
Racial Discrimination: Differential Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (2002); Norton et al., supra note 58; Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, 
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 (2005). 
 60. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 58; see also Norton et al., supra note 58. 
 61. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). 
 62. See generally id. 
 63. See Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 377. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Merritt et al., supra note 32; Miller & Effron, supra note 32. 
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example, people are more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior in an 
ambiguous situation when they have previously demonstrated a lack of 
prejudice.66 According to research on moral licensing, the initial opportunity to 
express unprejudiced attitudes provides a moral credential that reduces the 
salience of egalitarian norms on subsequent decision making and behavior. 
Because a person has engaged in a prior nonprejudiced act, the ambiguously 
discriminatory nature of a subsequent act is reappraised as legitimate rather 
than prejudicial. That is, an initial egalitarian decision acts as a moral credential 
that changes the way people construe their own ambiguously discriminatory 
behavior. After making an initial nonprejudiced decision, the salience of norms 
that demand egalitarianism tend to reduce and people are less likely to conceive 
of their own behavior as potentially biased. 
In these moral licensing studies, people are first granted the opportunity to 
express their egalitarian views or to exhibit their lack of prejudice by making 
an unbiased decision in favor of a member of a stereotyped group.67 This first 
step psychologically provides people a moral credential. In a seminal study, for 
example, participants were asked to consider five job applicants for a starting 
position in a consulting firm.68 The study manipulated whether the stellar 
candidate among the five applicants was a white woman, black man, or white 
man. When participants were presented with and then selected either the stellar 
white woman or black man, they were more likely to discriminate against 
female and minority employees in favor of a white man in subsequent 
employment decisions. These studies have revealed other ways in which to 
prompt moral credentials. Simply declaring one’s egalitarian values has been 
found to trigger this psychological effect, as has freely writing about a positive 
experience with a member of a stereotyped group and imagining a racist action 
that one could have taken but avoided in the past.69 By engaging in these kinds 
of egalitarian acts, people later tend to behave as if they have a moral 
credential, increasing the likelihood that they will engage in bias. 
After exhibiting a lack of prejudice in the first phase in these 
psychological experiments, people then encounter an ambiguous decision in 
which it is possible—potentially legitimate and rationalizable—to discriminate 
against members of stereotyped groups. These psychological studies reveal that 
participants are more likely to express bias in the subsequent decision. Moral 
licensing occurs when the second decision presents people with an ambiguous 
situation that contains a seemingly legitimate reason to discriminate against a 
member of a stereotyped group, such as gender-specific job norms,70 racial 
 
 66. See Bradley-Geist et al., supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing 
Racist Roads, supra note 33; Effron, Making Mountains of Morality, supra note 33; Mann & 
Kawakami, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
 67. See Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
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hostility in a small town hiring police officers,71 and scarce resources for 
dealing with crime.72 Because the first equalitarian decision suggests to oneself 
and others that one is neither sexist nor racist, one ceases to reflect on 
remaining egalitarian in subsequent decisions, thereby making it more likely 
that these later decisions will be tainted by bias. 
Synthesizing these two steps and returning to the seminal experiment on 
moral licensing,73 white participants were asked to view five job candidates 
and were told to pick the best candidate for the job. Half of the participants 
were assigned to a condition in which there were four white candidates and one 
black candidate. The black candidate was made to look the most exceptional of 
all candidates (e.g., prestigious education, highest GPA), subsequently causing 
participants to select the star black candidate. For the other half of the 
participants, there was no black candidate, just five white candidates, one of 
whom was also portrayed as the star candidate; thus participants in this 
condition all selected a white candidate for the job. According to the theory of 
moral credentialing, participants who were in the condition where they had the 
opportunity to select a black candidate would feel less psychological 
dissonance in behaving negatively toward subsequent black employees. In the 
second phase of the study, all participants were then given the opportunity to 
learn about an opening for a police officer position in a department that had a 
reputation for being hostile toward African Americans. They were then asked 
to indicate whether the police officer position was better suited for a black or 
white candidate. Ultimately, participants in the condition in which they had 
previously had the opportunity to hire a black candidate were more likely than 
those who had not had this opportunity to state that an open police officer 
position was better suited for a white candidate than a black candidate. Thus, 
ironically, engaging in an initial positive behavior toward a member of a 
stereotyped group freed white participants to make a subsequently biased 
decision in a situation where behaving biasedly could be rationalized as 
potentially unbiased. 
The psychological processes underlying moral credentialing have been 
observed outside the laboratory setting as well, although these tests have 
occurred in more general moral domains. For example, in a study of over 
twelve hundred adults in the United States and Canada, participants were 
messaged (on smartphones) several times a day for three days and asked about 
moral behaviors they observed and committed during the past hour.74 Evidence 
of moral credentialing was observed such that participants who engaged in a 
moral act at one point in the day were significantly more likely to engage in an 
 
 71. See Bradley-Geist et al., supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing 
Racist Roads, supra note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
 72. See Effron et al., supra note 20; Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33. 
 73. See Effron et al., supra note 20. 
 74. Wilhelm Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE 1340 (2014). 
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immoral act later that day. This naturalistic study highlights how individuals 
use their prior behavior as a basis to understand their moral self-concept, 
permitting them to behave less morally in contexts in which immoral acts can 
be justified without impugning their moral character. 
II. 
THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION 
We will begin by elaborating the origins of the same-actor inference 
doctrine and the doctrine’s troubled justifications. We then turn from the 
Fourth Circuit’s original elaboration of the doctrine in Proud v. Stone to the 
same-actor doctrine’s evolution and ever widening boundaries. We close by 
discussing the divide among the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the legal effect of 
the same-actor doctrine. 
A. The Same-Actor Inference 
In the early 1990s federal courts began applying the same-actor inference 
doctrine as a means of swiftly resolving motions for summary judgment in 
federal employment discrimination cases.75 The doctrine applies in 
employment discrimination cases that proceed under the theory of disparate 
treatment. Under Title VII, the ultimate issue in a disparate treatment case is 
whether the claimant was discriminated against because of the claimant’s race, 
color, religion, national origin, or sex.76 Given the difficulty of producing 
direct evidence of discrimination, most claimants proceed at summary 
judgment under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework 
and advance circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment. Depending on the 
quality and quantum of circumstantial evidence that a plaintiff presents, a 
federal court may rule that the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence that the 
defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for adversely treating her was pretextual. 
In such a case, a federal court would deny summary judgment, thereby 
allowing the case to be presented to the jury for final resolution on the merits. 
At summary judgment, however, many U.S. Courts of Appeals require 
federal district courts to apply the same-actor doctrine in employment 
discrimination cases.77 Indeed, the same-actor doctrine has been applied at 
 
 75. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds 
by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. 
Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against employees who 
oppose discrimination or participate in Title VII processes. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2012); 1 BARBARA 
T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 10–90 (4th ed. 2007). 
 77. See Arraleh v. Cty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (Title VII race and 
national origin discrimination case); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(Title VII race and national origin discrimination case); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 
267 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown, 82 F.3d at 658 (ADEA case); EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. 
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summary judgment in cases that assert disparate treatment discrimination on 
account of race,78 sex,79 national origin,80 disability,81 and age.82 These courts 
apply the same-actor doctrine when a supervisor first makes a decision that 
benefits the claimant and later that same supervisor makes another decision that 
adversely affects the claimant. The implicit theory supporting the doctrine is 
that a supervisor who holds bias against members of a stereotyped group would 
never have hired a member of such group (e.g., African Americans or women) 
in the first place; as such, because the supervisor has hired a member of the 
stereotyped group, the supervisor holds no bias against them, and hence the 
subsequent adverse decision cannot be discrimination. 
While frequently applied at summary judgment, the same-actor doctrine 
has considerable procedural breadth and has been incorporated into virtually all 
other federal civil procedural contexts: the pleading stage,83 summary 
judgment,84 judgment as a matter of law,85 and trial.86 Troublingly, courts after 
Twombly have also extended the same-actor inference to the pleading stage.87 
For example, in Long v. Teradata Corp., a district court applied the same-actor 
inference at the pleading stage and dismissed an amended complaint after 
declaring several of the plaintiff’s allegations to be legal conclusions and then 
deeming the remaining allegation insufficient to overcome the strong inference 
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 78. See Hobdy v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 79. See Bradley, 104 F.3d at 271. 
 80. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 81. See Jacques v. Clean-Up Grp., Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 512 (1st Cir. 1996); Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 
215. 
 82. See Brown, 82 F.3d at 658. 
 83. See Springs v. Mayer Brown, LLP, No. 3:09cv352, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6 (W.D.N.C. 
Oct. 20, 2009), objections overruled, No. 3:09cv352, 2010 WL 2347946 (W.D.N.C. June 9, 2010). 
 84. See Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416 (5th Cir. 2009); Peters v. 
Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 31 (9th Cir. 2007); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); Coghlan, 413 F.3d 1090; Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 
1998); Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 85. See Terrance v. Pointe Coupee Par. Police Jury, 177 F. App’x 457 (5th Cir. 2006); Burton 
v. Town of Littleton, 426 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2005); Hernandez v. Muns, No. 96-40087, 1996 WL 661171 
(5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1996). 
 86. See Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995). Several cases 
involved appeals in instances in which the court declined to provide a jury instruction regarding the 
same-actor inference. In these cases, the U.S. Courts of Appeals most often affirmed the district 
court’s decision not to provide such an instruction. See Jackson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 426 F. App’x 215 
(5th Cir. 2011); Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999); Parra v. Premier Salons Int’l, 
Inc., No. 97-50782, 1998 WL 792738 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int’l, Inc., No. 97-
9142, 1998 WL 514297 (2d Cir. June 11, 1998). 
 87. See Springs, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6. 
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resulting from the same-actor doctrine.88 Moreover, federal courts have applied 
the same-actor doctrine at trial, instructing juries on the same-actor inference 
and advising them, when applicable, to draw the strong inference of 
nondiscrimination when reaching a verdict.89 
Let us return to our first hypothetical discussed in the Introduction, where 
Mike denied Betty’s application for a promotion to a supervisory position and 
chose to promote Carl as a supervisor even though Carl was less qualified.90 
Here, unless Betty can produce extremely compelling direct evidence of 
discrimination that overcomes the strong inference of Mike’s 
nondiscrimination, Betty’s claim of sex discrimination will not survive 
summary judgment. The same-actor inference presumes that Mike’s decision to 
promote Carl over Betty cannot be influenced by gender bias because Mike 
hired Betty three years before. As this example suggests, this doctrine operates 
as a material restraint on breaking the glass ceiling by licensing discrimination 
at the promotion stage against women who have been hired by the same 
manager, despite psychological science which warns that, by first hiring these 
women, these managers are less likely to inhibit bias when failing to promote 
them. 
In the second example, per the same-actor doctrine, federal courts will 
deem Mike’s decision to fire Jason, a black man, presumptively free of 
discrimination and the case will be dismissed at summary judgment, unless 
Jason can produce compelling direct evidence of Mike’s intentional racial 
discrimination that overcomes the strong inference of nondiscrimination. But 
here, as well, psychological science on moral licensing explains that, because 
Mike hired Jason to begin with, Mike will likely behave as if he holds a moral 
 
 88. See Long v. Teradata Corp., No. 1:12cv787, 2012 WL 6026441, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 
2012) (applying the same-actor inference when dismissing a § 1981 claim at the pleading stage); 
Springs, 2009 WL 3461231, at *6 (applying the same-actor inference to dismiss complaint at pleading 
stage). There are several examples of district courts, however, explicitly rejecting application of the 
same-actor inference at the pleading stage. See FirstMerit Bank v. Ferrari, 71 F. Supp. 3d 751, 756 
(N.D. Ill. 2014); King v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4457, 2012 WL 4122025, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4327396 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
18, 2012); O’Diah v. Yogo Oasis, No. 11-cv-309, 2012 WL 691534, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012). 
There are also several examples in which employers sought dismissal based, in part, on the same-actor 
inference, in which district courts declined to apply the doctrine because the antecedents necessary for 
application of the doctrine had not been established. See Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 
481, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting the same-actor inference where the plaintiff alleged that she was 
hired to quiet minority employees complaining of discrimination and that employer made potentially 
discriminatory remarks); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-cv-9137, 2013 WL 5477600, at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (rejecting same-actor inference given the time-span between hiring and 
firing); Barrentine v. River Place Nursing Ctr., L.L.C., No. 1:11CV072, 2013 WL 494074, at *5 (N.D. 
Miss. Feb. 7, 2013) (rejecting same-actor inference at the pleading stage where multiple people were 
involved in the hiring and firing decision); Blakely v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1047 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (refusing to apply the same-actor inference and suggesting exceptions to the 
general rule). 
 89. See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 461. 
 90. See supra Introduction, at 7–7. 
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credential, increasing the hazard that he will make a biased decision at the 
firing stage later. Here, the same-actor doctrine reifies this psychological 
license into a legal license to engage in bias, thereby making it even more 
likely that injustice will operate against stereotyped employees in American 
workplaces. 
1. Origins of the Same-Actor Doctrine 
The earliest reference to the same-actor inference is Proud v. Stone, a 
1991 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.91 When 
crafting the same-actor doctrine, the Fourth Circuit referenced a law review 
article, authored by Professors John Donohue and Peter Siegelman,92 for the 
proposition that “[c]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in 
hiring seem irrational.”93 
In their article, Professors Donohue and Siegelman sought to explain the 
rise in employment discrimination filings between 1969 and 1987 and to 
account for the compositional shift in the kinds of employment-discrimination 
claims: mainly, the shift from hiring to discharge claims.94 Donohue and 
Siegelman discussed a number of explanations for the rising filing rate, such as 
macroeconomic trends and changes in the legal backdrop, including adoption 
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and the Age Discrimination 
Enforcement Act (ADEA). They sought to dispel several explanations for the 
rise in discrimination claims, including an increase in societal discrimination, 
the promotion of employment-discrimination litigation by plaintiff lawyers, 
and changes in the propensity for Americans to sue.95 The authors ultimately 
concluded that none of these explanations fully accounted for the rise in filings. 
Instead, Professors Donohue and Siegelman offered an alternate 
explanation “consistent with increasing litigation in an era of declining 
discrimination.”96 They cited national surveys on racial attitudes suggesting 
that overt prejudice had steadily waned.97 Ultimately, Donohue and Siegelman 
theorized that the increase in filing of employment discrimination cases could 
 
 91. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 92. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991). 
 93. See id. at 1017. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 1001 (“Growth in discrimination”), 1003 (“Litigation promoted by lawyers”) 
(“Changes in propensity to sue”). 
 96. See id. at 1001. 
 97. They note that survey studies document changes in self-reported beliefs and external 
conduct but do not answer the fundamental question of whether or not people harbor prejudice against 
minority groups. Id. Indeed, there is considerable social psychology literature that demonstrates that 
people self-censor when self reporting their own beliefs about stereotypes and the degree to which 
they would engage in discrimination in a particular context. Further, people often lack awareness into 
their own implicit processes and claim to be egalitarian, even when their actions suggest otherwise. 
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be explained by minorities receiving better jobs and workplace integration.98 
Specifically, they posited that, as women and minorities enter the workforce, 
the resulting increased wages and the prevalence of comparators make it much 
more likely for women and minorities to detect, appraise, and prove differences 
in treatment.99 The authors did not conclude that women and minorities faced 
greater levels of societal discrimination per se or resistance when rapidly 
entering American workplaces. Instead, their primary explanation was that 
minority-group members who enter the workplaces would have a greater 
economic incentive and ability to detect and prove discrimination. 
In explaining the shift from hiring claims to firing claims, Donohue and 
Siegelman theorized that one would observe this compositional shift because 
women and minorities no longer needed to complain about blanket exclusions 
from good jobs. Whereas in 1966, hiring charges outnumbered termination 
charges by 50 percent, by 1985 the pattern had reversed. The authors posited 
that societal discrimination and the nature of prejudice in American workplaces 
could not account for the rising rate of discharge claims.100 
While the authors explored a number of explanations for the rise in 
discharge claims, they did not examine the hypothesis that this rise could be 
attributed to the changing nature of prejudice against women and minorities in 
American workplaces––the shift from overt animus to modern forms of bias, 
such as aversive racism. Instead, the authors equated unlawful discrimination 
with overt animus, i.e., a taste for discrimination. When conceptualized in this 
manner, a sexist or racist who harbors overt animus against women or 
minorities would have refused to hire women and minorities in the first place. 
If this were the case, one would have hypothesized that hiring claims would be 
higher than firing claims all else being equal, rather than the reverse. As such, 
blatant racism and sexism could not explain the rise in discharge claims. 
 
 98. See id. at 984–85, 1006–11 (“The ‘better jobs’ effect”), 1011–14 (“The ‘integration’ 
effect”). 
 99. See id. at 1006–15 (“[T]he better-jobs and integration effects have an ironic aspect: The 
attainment of better and more integrated jobs for minorities is clearly a major goal of 
antidiscrimination laws, but society’s very success in meeting this goal has contributed to a sizable 
increase in employment discrimination lawsuits. Improvements in the workplace have spawned strife 
in the courtroom.”). 
 100. Id. at 1017 (“Claims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem 
irrational: it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the 
psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job. Such 
behavior seems doubly irrational given that the expected penalties for terminating a worker are 
probably much higher than for failing to hire her.” (footnotes omitted)). For the model of animus-
based employer discrimination, see BECKER, supra note 61, at 13–38; see also Donohue & Siegelman, 
supra note 92, at 1017 n.106. Donohue and Siegelman also noted that the legal standards for proving 
discrimination in hiring as opposed to firing cases did not change during this period, nor were there 
changes in the calculation of damages. On the latter point, they note that the probability of being sued 
for termination is six times greater than that for hiring given the availability of evidence. See Donohue 
& Siegelman, supra note 92, at 1017 n.107. 
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Soon after Donohue and Siegelman’s article was published, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted the above-mentioned language 
in its seminal decision articulating the same-actor inference doctrine. Proud v. 
Stone involved Warren Proud’s age discrimination claim against the U.S. 
Army. In Proud, the person who fired Proud was the same person who had 
hired him six months earlier. Affirming the lower court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment on Proud’s age-discrimination case, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that Proud’s case raised no genuine issue of material fact: 
One is quickly drawn to the realization that “[c]laims that employer 
animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational.” From 
the standpoint of the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly makes sense to 
hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the 
psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once 
they are on the job.” Therefore, in cases where the hirer and firer are 
the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within 
a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference 
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse 
action taken by the employer.101 
Unfortunately, the court in Proud v. Stone predicated the same-actor doctrine 
upon an erroneous psychological account. As previously discussed, blatant 
animus against women and minorities in hiring diminished between 1969 and 
1989, given that express rules barring the inclusion of women and minorities 
from the workplace were dismantled and affirmative-action policies began to 
offer equal access to American workplaces.102 Though American workplaces 
began to dismantle blanket exclusions and to implement affirmative action 
programs, the manifestation of implicit bias in favor of in-group members and 
against out-group members increased at later stages of the employment 
relationship, including promotion and termination. As workplaces became 
more diverse and diversity structures were poorly managed, majority-group 
members were more likely to express implicit bias in favor of in-group 
members and against women and minorities. That is, changing demographics in 
the workplace made social identity salient for many majority-group members 
who experienced the growing workplace representation of out-group members 
with anxiety and discomfort, as a threat for scarce resources and finite 
employment opportunities.103 
 
 101. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted). 
 102. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 103. See HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1981); Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A 
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979); Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An 
Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
33, 45–46 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979); Henri Tajfel et al., Social 
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Moreover, while explicit intergroup (between-group) bias against women 
and minorities began to wane, intragroup (within-category) bias began to wax 
against minorities and women for being too stereotypical, for failing to abide 
by prescriptive self-presentation norms, for failing the double-bind against 
minorities for being “too black, not acting white enough,” and for being “too 
feminine, not assertive enough” or “too masculine, bitchy.”104 So too, bias 
began to mutate like a disease into more challenging and persistent forms, 
including aversive racism, benevolent sexism,105 and intersectional bias.106 
As a result, the changing pattern of discrimination cases had much to do 
with the complex interaction and combined effect of many factors: prohibitions 
on express discriminatory bars on hiring, the mandate of affirmative-action 
policies in some workplaces to counteract the history of blatant racism and 
sexism against stereotyped group members, the changing nature of societal 
discrimination in American workplaces from blatant to less overt, and the 
phenomenon of implicit bias increasingly operating in favor of in-group 
members and against out-group members in American workplaces and via 
within-category bias. Troublingly, claims that employer bias existed at 
termination and promotion—especially during the period between 1969 and 
1989107—were not only plausible but likely108 given the influx of women and 
minorities into workplaces and the pervasive level of societal discrimination 
against members of stigmatized groups during this period.109 In short, the 
Fourth Circuit premised the doctrine on an erroneous psychological account of 
 
Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971); Henri Tajfel, Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1 (1982). 
 104. See Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, supra note 8; Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An 
Empirical Study with Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 185, 189–205 (2014). 
 105. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism 
as Complementary Justifications of Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109 (2001); Peter Glick & 
Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1996). 
 106. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; see Lawrence, supra note 9 at 322 (“Much of one’s inability to know racial 
discrimination when one sees it results from a failure to recognize that racism is . . . a disease.  This 
failure is compounded by a reluctance to admit that the illness of racism inflects almost everyone.”).  
 107. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 92, at 986. 
 108. Indeed, one national survey of over two thousand adults conducted in 1972 found that 9 
percent of respondents said that they had experienced job discrimination at least once in the last year. 
See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH, supra note 
19, at 3, 18 (citing BARBARA A. CURRAN, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE 
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 103 (1977)). A second national survey reported that about 11 
percent of those surveyed had experienced illegal or unfair treatment. Id. (citing KRISTIN BUMILLER, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 424 (1988)). 
 109. See JAMES W. VANDER ZANDEN, AMERICAN MINORITY RELATIONS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
RACE AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2d ed. 1966); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 
316 (exploring both racial attitudes and discrimination from 1988–89 to 1998–99). 
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prejudice, one that obscures how stereotyped groups experience bias in 
American workplaces. 
So began the same-actor inference doctrine. 
2. Two (Troubled) Justifications for the Same-Actor Inference: Common 
Sense and Economic Rationality 
Federal courts have articulated two reasons for the same-actor inference, 
justifying the doctrine on grounds of “common sense” and economic 
rationality. Applying the “common sense” theory, federal courts have 
explained that when the same actor is involved in both hiring and firing a 
claimant, a strong inference of nondiscrimination is warranted because a 
decision maker who dislikes members of a protected group would incur 
“psychological costs” by associating with them and firing them later. As such, 
this explanation presumes that a person who hires a claimant is extremely 
unlikely to hold bias toward that claimant or the claimant’s protected group.110 
This “common sense” rationale for the doctrine is implicitly predicated on the 
lay psychological account111 that people who hold bias against members of 
stereotyped groups experience dissonance when closely working with them. As 
such, these supervisors anticipate and avoid the dissonance by choosing not to 
hire out-group members. 
This lay psychological account is, of course, troubling, as we will explore 
in Part IV.112 Most Americans endorse egalitarian beliefs while also exhibiting 
implicit bias against members of stereotyped groups.113 Many Americans 
 
 110. See Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006); O’Brien v. Lucas 
Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 
(5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133 (2000); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1996); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 
796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App’x 312, 318 
(6th Cir. 2003). But see Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999) (criticizing the 
descriptive accuracy of this implicit theory). 
 111. As Krieger and Fiske have elsewhere described, we might refer to such a lay theory as a 
psychological metatheory underpinning legal theories as opposed to the legal theory itself. See Krieger 
& Fiske, supra note 7, at 998 n.2. 
 112. We leave for another day the more general critique of premising legal jurisprudence on 
“common sense,” “collective opinion,” and folk theories rather than on empirically based knowledge 
and scientific evidence. See generally BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). Since the dawn of Western civilization, 
philosophers have cautioned against premising law, morality, and justice on unexamined, common 
opinion. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ETHICS (Jonathan Barnes & Anthony Kenny trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 2014) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (Richard 
Hope trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1952); ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC (George A. Kennedy trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING (Peter Millican ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1748); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Roger Woolhouse ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1689) 
[hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 2008) [hereinafter PLATO, THE REPUBLIC]. 
 113. Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 315; Hodson et al., supra note 59, 
at 460–64. 
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would find it aversive to overtly deliberate on whether to hire a member of a 
stereotyped group in light of the potential discomfort of associating with 
them.114 Such explicit reasoning threatens virtually every American’s sense of 
rationality, egalitarianism, and nonprejudice. Nonetheless, societal 
discrimination is pervasive and persistent.115 This is, in part, because in 
contemporary American society prejudice limits the opportunities of minorities 
in ways more difficult to detect and eradicate, such as through structures that 
allow implicit bias to operate against members of stereotyped groups and 
institutions that result in disparate outcomes.116 When hiring discrimination 
occurs, this discrimination may have been influenced by implicit bias. The 
expression of this bias can be considered from the perspective of dual-process 
theories in psychology. Dual-process perspectives on prejudice demonstrate 
that bias is likely to occur when situations afford discretion and subjectivity, as 
these contexts provide many potential reasons for any given decision and 
individuals may believe they are objective when they are in fact influenced by 
implicit biases and stereotypes. 
Second, some courts predicate the same-actor inference doctrine on 
“economic rationality.” Federal courts that elaborate this basis contend that 
employer animus at termination, rather than at hiring, is economically 
irrational. The implicit behavioral theory behind this justification presupposes 
that, rather than hiring workers from a group one dislikes and firing them later, 
an economically rational discriminator would refuse to hire stereotyped group 
members at all: put rather bluntly, given the transaction costs of hiring and 
training employees, refusing to hire a worker from the stigmatized group would 
be more economically rational. Further, given the difficulty of proving 
discrimination in hiring as compared to firing, an efficient discriminator would 
choose to discriminate at hiring rather than firing. As such, discrimination 
within American workplaces is unlikely. 
As Part IV will elaborate, the economic irrationality justification is deeply 
flawed. The economic irrationality account presumes, for example, that bias 
 
 114. See Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 
6; Hodson et al., supra note 59, at 460. 
 115. Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-Based Standards of 
Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for Devalued Groups, 72 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544 (1997); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 51, at 
318; Hodson et al., supra note 59, at 460–64. 
 116. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling 
Bias in Hiring, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 238, 239–43 (2012); Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra 
note 51, at 315, 318; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 6; Dovidio, supra note 4, at 836–38; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, supra note 52, at 111–20; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1032–34; Nier & Gaertner, 
supra note 4, at 209–10; Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use 
of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 230 (“Based on the evidence we can glean from the 
interactions between testers and employers in our field experiments, it seemed that only in rare cases 
were employers categorically unwilling to hire African Americans.” (citing Devah Pager et al., 
Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 787–88 
(2009))); Richeson & Shelton, supra note 52, at 287. 
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against members of stereotyped groups operates like ordinary preferences that 
consumers seek to cost-benefit maximize in market transactions. Yet decades 
of social psychological research have revealed that contemporary prejudice 
does not operate like ordinary consumer preferences.117 Most Americans would 
not openly deliberate at the hiring stage on how to hedonically maximize a 
misogynistic or hostile racial preference in cost-benefit fashion.118 To be sure, 
biased decisions can, and often are, rationalized after the fact based on 
seemingly neutral criteria—a phenomenon known as casuistry or shifting 
standards.119 Even so, one must distinguish the phenomenon of rationalizing a 
biased decision post hoc120 from the phenomenon of arriving at a biased 
decision after cost-benefit maximizing a psychopathological taste for 
discrimination. That is, people’s actual behavior does not follow the dictates of 
the efficient discriminator model,121 and the economic rationality account is an 
inaccurate depiction of how people, in fact, behave in the day-to-day. Despite 
the “economic irrationality” of bias in American workplaces, discrimination 
persists. 
B. Evolution and Permutations of the Same-Actor Inference 
In this Section, we describe the evolution and permutations of the same-
actor doctrine—that is, the ever-widening boundary of factual scenarios in 
which courts have applied the same-actor inference. We turn first to the 
antecedent factual postures triggering application of the doctrine and then to 
the legal consequences of the doctrine at summary judgment. 
 
 117. See Dovidio, supra note 4, at 830–33; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1028, 1037, 1051; 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations and Affirmative Action, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1310 (1988); see also Dan Ariely & Michael I. Norton, How Actions Create—
Not Just Reveal—Preferences, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 13 (2008). 
 118. Unfortunately, instances occur in which businesses seek to cater to the discriminatory 
preferences of their customers or employees. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04-CV-
4237, 2010 WL 3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010). 
 119. See Norton et al., supra note 58. 
 120. See Monica Biernat & Kathleen Fuegen, Shifting Standards and the Evaluation of 
Competence: Complexity in Gender-Based Judgment and Decision Making, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES. 707 
(2001); Julie E. Phelan et al., Competent Yet Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406 (2008). 
 121. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 177 (2009) (“The relation between rational 
choice and actual behaviour connects, in fact, with a long-standing divide in the discipline of 
economics, with some authors tending to think that it is by and large correct to assume that people’s 
actual behaviour would follow the dictates of rationality, while others remain deeply sceptical of that 
presumption. This difference in foundational assumptions about human behaviour, and in particular 
the scepticism about taking actual behaviour to be identifiably rational, has not, however, prevented 
modern economics from using rational choice quite extensively as a predictive device. The assumption 
is used often enough without any particular defence, but when some defence is given, it tends to take 
the form of either arguing that as a general rule this is close enough to the truth (despite some well-
known divergence), or that the assumed behaviour is useful enough for the purpose at hand, which 
may differ from seeking the most truthful description.”). 
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1. Antecedent Fact Patterns Triggering the Same-Actor Inference 
When first designed by the Fourth Circuit in Proud v. Stone, the court 
defined the same-actor inference doctrine as follows: “In cases where the hirer 
and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs 
within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference 
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action 
taken by the employer.”122 Since first elaborated, the doctrine has loosened 
from this original factual mooring and drifted, widening in meaning and scope. 
Federal courts have significantly extended the allowable timespan between 
favorable and unfavorable action; broadened the doctrine to employment 
practices beyond hiring and firing, such as promotion and transfers; and 
expanded the meaning of “same individual” to include different groups of 
people who make employment decisions. Additionally, some federal courts 
enhance the flawed doctrine when the actor and claimant are of the same 
protected group.123 
Regarding the timespan between favorable and unfavorable treatment, 
Proud v. Stone envisioned that the strong inference of nondiscrimination would 
apply only when these employment actions were “within a relatively short time 
span.”124 Nonetheless, circuit courts are now divided on whether the nexus of 
time connecting the positive and adverse employer actions is a necessary 
criterion of the same-actor doctrine at all. For example, in Buhrmaster v. 
Overnite Transportation Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision to instruct the jury on the same-actor inference, despite the fact that 
the case involved a period of seven and a half years. En route, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that “a short period of time is not an essential element of the same 
actor inference, at least in cases where the plaintiff’s [protected] class does not 
change.”125 
In a number of cases, moreover, the Fifth Circuit affirmed application of 
the same-actor inference when the favorable and unfavorable actions were 
three years apart,126 four years apart,127 and five years apart.128 Finally, in two 
 
 122. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
 123. See Robinson v. Am. Acryl NA, LLC, No. H-06-570, 2007 WL 471121 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 
2007); Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:05CV388KS, 2007 WL 465664 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 
2007), aff’d in part, 549 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2008); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 
1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 
(2000).  
 124. See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797. 
 125. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Coghlan v. 
Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (“First, this length of time [of three years] 
would be significant only had Coghlan proffered evidence suggesting that Andreassen developed a 
bias against [his protected group] during that period; but he did not.”). 
 126. See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 127. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 128. See Brooks v. Lubbock Cty. Hosp. Dist., 373 F. App’x 434 (5th Cir. 2010); Boyd v. State 
Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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troubling examples, the Fifth Circuit applied the same-actor inference despite 
the fact that the favorable and unfavorable employment actions were more than 
seven years apart.129 
Applying these approaches to our example involving Betty the computer 
programmer, a federal district court would be within the allowable bounds of 
doctrinal leeway to impose a strong inference of nondiscrimination where 
Mike’s decision to hire Betty and his failure to promote her were more than 
three years apart. Problematically, this example is precisely the factual scenario 
in which most failure-to-promote claims arise: after learning, growing, and 
gathering experience for several years, employees often seek promotions. 
When the person who originally takes favorable action toward a claimant 
is not the same person who adversely treats the claimant, the same-actor 
inference does not apply.130 Even so, federal courts have broadened the “same 
individual” requirement to apply to collective or group decision making. Thus 
the same-actor inference now applies when groups of people engage in 
employment decision making.131 Often this doctrinal permutation has applied 
when virtually the same group of people makes both the favorable and 
unfavorable decisions. However, several circuit courts have affirmed the grant 
of summary judgment when many (as opposed to most or all) of the decision 
makers were the same.132 
 
 129. See Lewis v. 20th-82nd Judicial Dist., No. 99-50189, 1999 WL 642898 (5th Cir. July 29, 
1999). 
 130. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999) (declining to apply 
the same-actor inference in a Title VII action at the summary judgment stage when the person who 
originally hired the claimants differed from the person who subsequently failed to reinstate them), 
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also Burgess v. 
Bowen, 466 F. App’x 272 (4th Cir. 2012); Russell v. Mountain Park Health Ctr. Props., 403 F. App’x 
195, 195–96 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Wolgat v. Tam-O-Shanter Country Club, No. 97-1135, 1998 WL 
69281 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1998) (affirming the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff alleging sex 
discrimination under Title VII in discriminatory termination for alternate reasons). 
 131. See Mischer v. Erie Metro Hous. Auth., 168 F. App’x 709 (6th Cir. 2006); DeJarnette v. 
Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1998) (same company); Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1128–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (same company); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 
F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992) (same company officials or same people); Campbell v. All. Nat’l Inc., 
107 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. 
App’x 312 (6th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Yonkers Pub. Sch., 326 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“[T]he [same-actor] inference may be applied even when the supervisor at issue . . . is not the only 
person with input into the hiring and firing decision. The inference ‘is applicable so long as one 
management-level employee played a substantial role in both the hiring and firing of the plaintiff.’” 
(quoting Ramos v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))). 
 132. See Houk v. Peoploungers Inc., 214 F. App’x 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (one of multiple decision 
makers); Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006) (same) (affirming summary 
judgment granted against employee who brought claim against former employer asserting Title VII 
claims for race and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and other claims, and applying same-
actor inference in the context of the discrimination claims at the pretext stage); Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2006) (same), overruled by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 
(7th Cir. 2013); Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App’x 312 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); 
Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Sreeram v. La. State Univ. 
Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). 
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This doctrinal permutation is in tension with realities in the modern 
American workplace.133 In our second hypothetical, if Mike hired Jason, and 
Mike and Dan (his seemingly prejudiced supervisor) were both involved in 
deciding to fire him several years later, a court might nonetheless apply the 
same-actor inference doctrine. Mike was the “same individual” who played a 
role in both hiring and firing Jason; hence, a court would presume that the 
decision to fire was not discriminatory. Even assuming that a single individual 
is unbiased within a larger group, the presence of that individual in the second 
group should not be legally presumed to block the expression of bias against a 
member of a protected group. Indeed, the mere presence of a group can 
decrease the likelihood that a well-intentioned person will speak up or engage 
in actions that run counter to situational norms, especially when the person 
setting the norm has power and status. The doctrine, moreover, presumes that 
the group of people who made the first favorable action was unbiased; yet, as 
we discuss below, several compelling reasons exist as to why the first group 
may have chosen to hire a member of a protected group. For example, the 
female or black candidate might have been unambiguously the most qualified 
candidate, and the hiring team might have deployed clear, determinate hiring 
criteria. 
This permutation is also predicated on the implicit theory that people who 
comprise a decision-making group are more likely to confront bias. Yet fear of 
reprisal or censure prevents many well-intentioned, egalitarian actors from 
speaking up in groups and curtailing bias.134 Considerable psychological 
science exists on the extent to which individuals confront wrongdoers within 
groups to reduce sexism and racism within workplaces.135 While research 
reveals that majority-group members and minority-group members are 
generally inclined to confront bias when imagining a sexist or racist encounter, 
in reality many women and minorities remain silent in actual sexist or racist 
encounters. For example, confrontation requires that decision makers detect 
discrimination, perceive the incidence as urgently requiring rectification, 
personally take responsibility to confront, and decide how to confront.136 At the 
same time, there are material and psychological barriers to confronting 
 
 133. See Jean-Baptiste v. K–Z, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 652 (N.D. Ind. 2006). Professor Natasha 
Martin ably argues this point and problematizes the modern workplace’s dynamics of collective 
decision making and organizational dimensions. Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the 
Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1117 (2008). 
 134. See Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: 
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 496–500 (2001) 
(applying insights from the social psychology of group decision making to disparate treatment cases 
involving multiple decision makers). 
 135. See Julia C. Becker et al., Confronting and Reducing Sexism: A Call for Research on 
Intervention, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 603, 605–08 (2014). 
 136. See Sarah J. Gervais & Amy L. Hillard, Confronting Sexism as Persuasion: Effects of a 
Confrontation’s Recipient, Source, Message, and Context, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 653, 654–56 (2014). 
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prejudice, including social costs to the person who confronts, such as fear of 
retaliation or being perceived as overreacting, whiny, oversensitive, 
interpersonally cold, troublemaking, self-interested, or egoistic.137 Moreover, 
people are far less likely to confront bias when the perpetrator holds more 
power in an employment setting than the would-be confronter.138 
The breadth of the favorable employment action that triggers the same-
actor inference has broadened from hiring to other actions, some formal, others 
quite informal. For example, the antecedent employment action has extended 
from hiring to recommending hiring,139 from promotion140 to recommending 
promotion,141 to transfer,142 rehiring,143 and even abstaining from taking 
potentially unfavorable action against the claimant, such as by providing 
employee performance scores that are high enough to avoid vulnerability to 
discharge.144 The latter courts appear to suggest that withholding unfavorable 
action against a female or minority employee on a prior occasion may trigger a 
strong inference of nondiscrimination on a later date.145 
Returning to our second hypothetical, assume that another manager, 
Steven, hires Jason, and then Mike transfers Jason to a logistics warehouse that 
the logistics company thinks is more favorable than Jason’s original location. 
At the new warehouse, Dan is assigned as Jason’s supervisor; problems begin. 
If Mike later terminates Jason after Dan’s unjustified write-ups, Mike would be 
deemed the same-actor, and many courts would apply the same-actor doctrine 
and presume that Mike’s firing of Jason was nondiscriminatory. 
Taken together, these doctrinal permutations are precisely those that 
plaintiff-side employment-discrimination attorneys have urged their colleagues 
to raise when distinguishing their cases from those in which the same-actor 
 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 655–56 (“[A] woman who confronts may be seen as acting with self-
interest and conforming to expectations, whereas a man who confronts may be seen as acting without 
self-interest and violating expectations, which may cause surprise and positive regard.”). 
 138. See Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Do You Say Something When It’s Your Boss? The Role of 
Perpetrator Power in Prejudice Confrontation, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 617–22 (2014). 
 139. See Bergeron v. Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, No. 98-31019, 1999 WL 766403, at *13 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 31, 1999) (affirming district court grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on claims 
of sexual harassment); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 140. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 231 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other 
grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 804 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
 141. See Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming in part and reversing 
in part the grant of summary judgment). 
 142. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005); Washington v. 
Valspar Indus. Coatings Grp., No. 01-60458, 2002 WL 753503 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (affirming the 
grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory firing based on age); LeBlanc v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 143. See Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 144. See Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 F. App’x 495 (6th Cir. 2011); EEOC v. Boeing 
Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing the court to apply the same-actor inference but 
not requiring a “strong inference”). 
 145. See Idemudia, 434 F. App’x at 495; Boeing Co., 577 F.3d at 1051–52. 
32 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  104:1 
doctrine first began.146 These plaintiff-side employment-discrimination 
attorneys have urged their colleagues, when apt, to contend that new and 
different persons are involved in hiring and firing, that the passage of time 
should defeat the doctrine’s application, and that the same-actor inference 
should not apply in failure-to-promote cases.147 Yet these are precisely the 
doctrinal permutations that many federal courts have broadened the boundary 
of the doctrine to subsume. While some scholars have critiqued the advocacy 
of plaintiff-side employment attorneys for failing to raise similar objections,148 
the substantive doctrine is adrift, widening and leaving less leeway for counsel 
to press arguments to the contrary. 
2. Presumption Enhanced When the Claimant and Actor Belong to the 
Same Protected Group 
Further, many federal courts expressly strengthen the same-actor 
inference when the “actor” (i.e., the supervisor, manager, or employer) is of the 
same racial, gender, or ethnic group as the claimant.149 This doctrinal 
permutation has been applied in the context of claimants and supervisors who 
belong to the same protected groups based on age,150 gender,151 and race.152 
Indeed, in one unusual case reversed by the Seventh Circuit, a magistrate judge 
heightened the same-actor inference where both the supervisor and claimant 
belonged to protected groups, albeit different protected groups: the supervisor 
was Hispanic and the plaintiff was black.153 There, the lower court appears to 
have presumed either that interracial bias between minority groups does not 
exist or that minorities cannot harbor bias, two lay theories that decades of 
 
 146. See Lisa Dunne, Challenge “Same Actor” Inference on Summary Judgment, JAMES PUB. 
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://jamespublishing.com/2014/employment-discrimination [http://perma.cc/72KZ-
LRM7]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of 
Plaintiffs’ Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59 (2013). 
 149. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds 
by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (applying same-actor doctrine 
when defendant shared claimants’ class as a strengthened inference); Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. 
Dist., No. 2:05CV388KS-MTP, 2007 WL 465664, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2007), aff’d in part, 549 
F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2008); Robinson v. Am. Acryl N.A., No. H-06-570, 2007 WL 471121, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 8, 2007); Mercer v. Capitol Mgmt. & Realty, Inc., 242 F. App’x 162, 164 (5th Cir. 2007); 
see also Hervey v. Miss. Dep’t of Educ., 404 F. App’x 865, 871 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 150. See, e.g., Washington v. Valspar Indus. Coatings Grp., No. 01-60458, 2002 WL 753503 
(5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2002) (affirming the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that he was 
discriminatorily fired because of his age); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
 151. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 152. See Hobdy v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 153. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming and reversing 
summary judgment ruling on racial discrimination claim). 
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social psychological literature have discredited.154 This decision is a highly 
aggressive doctrinal elaboration that impermissibly extends the doctrine, as 
some courts have warned.155 
This permutation implicitly presumes that all members of a stereotyped 
group, such as black employees or female employees, will not engage in bias or 
discrimination against other members of their own stereotyped groups. This 
doctrinal permutation, however, fails to connect with the phenomenon of 
intragroup bias (e.g., bias by black employees against other black employees 
who experience the “racial doublebind” of being perceived as “not black 
enough” or “too black,” too Afrocentric, or stereotypically black).156 Further 
the doctrinal elaboration fails to reach intersectional discrimination (e.g., a 
white female manager may not harbor bias against other white women or black 
men, but may harbor bias against black women).157  Consider, for example, a 
variation of the hypothetical in which Mike, a black male supervisor, failed to 
promote Betty, a black female programmer, in favor of Carol, a white female 
programmer, with less experience. 
Some federal courts have signaled that heightening the same-actor 
inference in this situation is inappropriate and in tension with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s rejection of a “conclusive presumption” that an employer, or 
presumably its agents, will not discriminate against members of its own race or 
gender.158 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., for example, the 
Court explicitly advised that, “[b]ecause of the many facets of human 
motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human 
beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of 
their group.”159 Despite Oncale, however, many courts still heighten the 
inference of nondiscrimination in this scenario. 
3. Legal Effect of the Same-Actor Inference 
In this Section, we now turn from the evolving antecedents of the same-
actor doctrine to the legal consequence of the same-actor inference at summary 
judgment. To situate this discussion, we first briefly explain how federal courts 
adjudicate most disparate treatment claims at summary judgment. 
Given the difficulty of unearthing “smoking-gun” or direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination during discovery, most plaintiffs produce 
 
 154. See Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized Stigmatize? The 
Ironic Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group Prejudice-Expression Norms, 95 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877 (2008). 
 155. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 156. See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 15; Shapiro & Neuberg, supra note 154, at 877. 
 157. See Crenshaw, supra note 106, at 140; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who 
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
 158. See Feingold, 366 F.3d at 155. 
 159. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)). 
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circumstantial evidence of disparate-treatment discrimination at summary 
judgment.160 That is, most plaintiffs provide circumstantial evidence from 
which a court may infer that an employer discriminated. This circumstantial 
evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting 
scheme, which allocates the burden of production and order for presenting 
proof.161 
Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, plaintiffs must first 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This prima facie case has been 
described as a “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of 
common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination” at 
summary judgment.162 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a member in a protected class, (2) she was qualified for a given 
job, (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) a causal 
connection exists between the adverse action and the protected characteristic. 
In practice, on the fourth element, many federal courts now require plaintiffs to 
prove that employers treated similarly situated employees outside the protected 
class more favorably.163 For example, Betty in our first hypothetical would 
establish a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination based on the 
failure to promote her by showing that she was qualified for the denied 
promotion and that the man ultimately promoted, Carl, was not similarly 
qualified. 
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
action.164 This burden is merely one of production, not of persuasion, meaning 
 
 160. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing direct versus 
circumstantial evidence under Title VII); LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76. 
 161. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 
n.3 (2003) (interpreting the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (same); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505–12 
(1993) (same). 
 162. See U.S. Postal Serv Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 
534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
 163. See, e.g., Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2009). In disparate-treatment 
cases, the last element—whether the employer treated similarly situated people outside of the 
plaintiff’s protected class differently—is often determinative of whether a claim withstands summary 
judgment. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76, at 23. Circuit courts disagree on how 
rigorously to apply this final element. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 
YALE L.J. 728, 743–48 (2011) (explaining that the “similarly situated” element has in essence become 
a widely employed heuristic). Some require plaintiffs to show that “similarly situated” employees were 
nearly identical in all or most respects. See, e.g., Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 
213 (5th Cir. 2004); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). Others hold plaintiffs 
to a less exacting standard. See, e.g., Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, 417 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 
889, 894–95 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 164. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49 n.3. 
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that federal courts do not review the “credibility” or plausibility of the 
employer’s rationale.165 If the employer offers some nondiscriminatory reason 
for the adverse action, the presumption of intentional discrimination 
disappears. In the third and final step, the plaintiff must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s reason was mere pretext for 
discrimination.166 In deciding whether the defendant’s explanation is 
pretextual, the court may consider the evidence establishing plaintiff’s prima 
facie case and any inferences properly drawn therefrom.167 Courts have applied 
this summary judgment framework to a wide variety of workplace 
circumstances, including hiring, discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, 
demotion, retaliation, and other adverse employment actions.168 
At the pretext stage, Betty could establish that the technology company’s 
purported nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to promote her was pretextual, 
masking sex bias. Mike explained that, though Carl was technically less 
qualified, he thought Carl would be a better leader of computer programmer 
teams. Betty could attempt to show that Mike’s decision was based on gender 
stereotypes that women are not as competent and capable as men in science and 
engineering fields, including computer science.169 
Connecting McDonnell Douglas-Burdine to the legal effect of the same-
actor inference, federal courts have operationalized the same-actor inference at 
the third step of the summary judgment framework.170 In this third step, 
 
 165. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ct., 509 U.S. at 509). 
 166. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 49 n.3; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. 
 167. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. 
 168. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 76, at 12–13. 
 169. See Hill et al., supra note 27, at 38 (“Negative stereotypes about girls’ and women’s 
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PROC. NAT’L ACAD. NAT’L SCI. 16474 (2012); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. 
Greenwald, Math = Male, Me = Female, Therefore Math ≠ Me, 83 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 44 (2002); Patrick D. Healy & Sara Rimer, Furor Lingers as Harvard Chief Gives Details 
of Talk on Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/education/furor-
lingers-as-harvard-chief-gives-details-of-talk-on-women.html [perma.cc/HVJ8-DCY7] (“[T]he 
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and employers’ current desires for high power and high intensity; that in the special case of science 
and engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude . . . .’”).  
 170. See Hernandez v. Muns, No. 96-40087, 1996 WL 661171, at *3 n.6 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 
1996) (“Depending on the factual setting, the same actor inference may be considered in determining 
whether a purported prima facie case, resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, has been sufficiently 
made out, although more usually the same actor inference will have its primary relevance at a later 
stage of the case.”). But see Cordell v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 331 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(applying the same-actor inference in concluding that the claimant had failed to establish a prima facie 
case and show that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination). 
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plaintiffs must establish that their employer’s rationale is pretextual.171 When 
applied, the same-actor inference greatly heightens the quantum and quality of 
evidence that the plaintiff must produce to survive summary judgment. Some 
federal courts reason as if the same-actor doctrine enacts a virtually 
insurmountable presumption of nondiscrimination, demanding that the claimant 
produce “smoking-gun” evidence of discrimination to survive summary 
judgment. In contrast, other courts have concluded that the same-actor 
inference is merely evidence for the trier of fact to weigh. In short, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals diverge on the legal effect and analytical significance of the 
same-actor inference,172 and the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve this 
divide. 
The Second,173 Fourth,174 Fifth,175 Eighth,176 and Ninth177 Circuits, for 
example, hold that the same-actor doctrine enacts a “strong inference” that the 
defendant did not engage in discrimination. These federal courts consider the 
same-actor inference very compelling178 and at times equate the strong 
inference to a virtually irrefutable presumption of nondiscrimination, having 
explained that the claimant must come forward with “an extraordinarily strong 
showing of discrimination” to overcome the “strong inference” of 
nondiscrimination.179 Under this view, plaintiffs must produce direct evidence 
of discrimination to survive the same-actor inference applied at summary 
judgment,180 including direct evidence such as statements exhibiting animus.181 
 
 171. See, e.g., Dabney v. Christmas Tree Shops, 958 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Auguste 
v. N.Y. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 593 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Abouzied v. Roy H. Mann Jr. 
H.S. No. 78, No. 97-CV-7613, 2000 WL 1276635 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000). 
 172. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 173. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 174. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds 
by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 175. See Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 176. See Arraleh v. Cty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 177. See Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 178. Some have deemed the inference highly persuasive. See, e.g., Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace 
& Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to rebut the strong same-actor inference); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 
174 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The most important fact here is that plaintiff was a member of the protected age 
group both at the time of his hiring and at the time of his firing, and that the same people who hired 
him also fired him.”); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (urging the early dismissal of 
cases where the same individual both hired and fired the plaintiff). 
 179. See Crudder v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. No. 11, 468 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1097 (requiring plaintiff to make an “extraordinarily strong showing of 
discrimination” to overcome the same-actor inference); see also Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 
F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2006); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2000); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 
174; Covarrubias v. Brink’s, Inc., No. C05-5196, 2006 WL 3203733 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2006); 
Kassa v. Selland Auto Transp., Inc., No. C05-1304, 2006 WL 2927706 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2006). 
 180. See Adams v. Greenbrier Oldsmobile/GMC/Volkswagen, Inc., No. 97-1544, 1999 WL 
34907 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1999) (reversing district court’s application of the same-actor inference in 
granting a Rule 50(a) motion because the plaintiff had presented direct evidence––compelling 
evidence of discrimination). 
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Nevertheless, in several reported cases, these U.S. Courts of Appeals refused to 
set aside application of the same-actor inference where direct evidence in the 
record strongly suggested discriminatory animus was afoot.182 Indeed, in 
several reported cases, these circuit courts described the doctrine as enacting an 
“anti-animus presumption.”183 Within these circuits, a minority of panels has 
applied the same-actor inference at summary judgment as a weak inference of 
nondiscrimination.184 
Returning to our hypothetical, Betty will most likely proffer 
circumstantial evidence at summary judgment that Mike failed to promote her 
because of her gender, as Betty was otherwise well qualified for the promotion 
and there are few female supervisors at the Silicon Valley technology 
company. Yet because Mike is the same individual who both hired and failed to 
promote her, these courts will apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination. In 
this scenario, the technology company will argue that her male coworker was 
better qualified for the position than Betty. Applying the same-actor inference 
on these facts, absent “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination, Betty will fail 
to establish a genuine dispute of material fact of gender discrimination and her 
case will be dismissed at summary judgment. A jury will not be granted the 
opportunity to weigh the evidence in favor or and against discrimination. 
Other U.S. Courts of Appeals, such as the Third185 and Sixth Circuits,186 
have held that the same-actor inference is not a mandatory presumption but 
rather an inference that a federal court may draw at summary judgment.187 In 
several instances, these courts have stated that summary judgment would be 
improper if the plaintiff has otherwise raised a genuine issue of material fact.188 
 
 181. See Johnson v. Boys & Girls Clubs of S. Puget Sound, 191 F. App’x 541, 544–45 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 182. Although several cases had highly derogatory statements in the record, the same-actor 
inference was nonetheless applied. See Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“stronger field general”); Peters v. Shamrock Foods Co., 262 F. App’x 30, 32 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a 
mom [who] could not travel”); Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Boyd v. State Farm 
Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[p]orch [m]onkey,” “[b]uckwheat”); Richmond v. 
Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1997) (“[W]hat? Are you 
pregnant?”). 
 183. See O’Brien v. Lucas Assocs. Pers., Inc., 127 F. App’x 702, 707 (5th Cir. 2005); see also 
Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 184. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
plaintiff “produced no meaningful evidence indicating either that [the employer’s] proffered 
explanation was false or that her supervisor harbored discriminatory animus towards her because she 
was a woman”); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174–75 (holding that the same-actor inference warranted summary 
judgment because the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext was “thin”). 
 185. See Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the same-
actor inference “is simply evidence like any other and should not be accorded any presumptive value” 
(quoting the EEOC’s brief in the case)). 
 186. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 187. See id. at 573. 
 188. See, e.g., id.; Gaglioti v. Levin Grp., Inc., 508 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2012); Idemudia 
v. JP Morgan Chase, 434 Fed. Appx. 495 (6th Cir. 2011).  
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Of course, the strength of circumstantial evidence is inherently subjective, and 
judges’ own experiences may shape their interpretations of how reasonable an 
evidentiary inference may be.189 Under this permutation, a federal court would 
be permitted to apply the same-actor inference at summary judgment when 
dismissing the plaintiff’s case or at least to consider the same-actor inference 
when deciding whether the inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence 
is sufficiently reasonable to be considered by the ultimate trier of fact. Under 
this jurisprudential approach, while Betty may not technically be required to 
offer direct evidence of discrimination, if a federal district court chooses to 
apply the same-actor inference, her circumstantial case of discrimination will 
be perceived as less probative and the technology company will likely prevail 
at summary judgment.190 
Finally, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have essentially rejected 
application of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment, equating the 
same-actor situation to potential evidence of nondiscrimination for the ultimate 
trier of fact to consider.191 The Seventh Circuit has, for example, concluded 
that “[t]he ‘common actor’ or ‘same-actor’ inference is a reasonable inference 
that may be argued to the jury, but it is not a conclusive presumption that 
applies as a matter of law.”192 These courts have also described the same-actor 
doctrine as merely a convenient shorthand that describes the factual scenario in 
which a claimant has presented insufficient evidence of discrimination.193 
According to this view, reliance on the same-actor inference to carry the 
moving party over the hurdle of summary judgment is legally impermissible, 
because drawing legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions and, at 
summary judgment, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the 
moving party that the jury is not required to believe.194 As such, “it is the 
province of the jury rather than the court . . . to determine whether the inference 
generated by ‘same actor’ evidence is strong enough to outweigh a plaintiff’s 
evidence of pretext.”195 
 
 189. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of 
Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (2011). 
 190. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000). 
 191. See Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 F. 
App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). Indeed, some 
district courts in the Second Circuit have taken this approach when the evidence of gender 
discrimination is extremely stark. See, e.g., Braunstein v. Barber, No. 06 Civ. 5978, 2009 WL 849589 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 1542707 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 
2009). 
 192. Perez, 731 F.3d at 699, 709; see also Blasdel v. Nw. Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 
2012) (citing Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 193. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 194. See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming on 
alternate ground summary judgment grant of plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 195. See Williams, 144 F.3d at 1438 (reversing the grant of summary judgment where former 
employee sued under the ADEA, asserting discriminatory discharge and failure to hire claims). 
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III. 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH RATE OF THE SAME-ACTOR 
DOCTRINE 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of the same-actor inference, 
commencing first with a literature review of prior empirical analyses that have 
examined the same-actor doctrine. We then build upon these prior studies by 
contributing our own analysis that examines the growth rate in application of 
the doctrine at summary judgment by federal district courts nationally and 
across federal circuits. 
Prior empirical studies have revealed that the doctrine increases case 
dismissals at summary judgment. Professor Natasha Martin conducted an 
exhaustive empirical legal study on the same-actor inference,196 investigating 
decisions applying the same-actor inference doctrine by the circuit courts and 
district courts in 2006, 2007, and 2008.197 Her sample included decisions 
adjudicating the same-actor inference under all federal statutes that forbid 
employment discrimination.198 Martin found that the courts of appeals affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment for the employer, applying the same-actor 
doctrine, in 80 (78.43 percent) out of 102 decisions. Moreover, during this 
three-year period, district courts granted summary judgment for employers in 
180 (77.58 percent) out of 232 decisions, applying the same-actor doctrine. 
Martin flagged that plaintiffs in race and gender cases bore the brunt of the 
same-actor inference doctrine when compared to claimants who asserted claims 
based on other protected categories.199 This empirical legal study reveals a 
striking trend: when a court adjudicates the same-actor inference, that court 
will very likely grant (or affirm the grant of) summary judgment and dismiss 
the claimant’s case. 
Empirical studies on the same-actor doctrine demonstrate that the 
substantive scope of the doctrine is meaningful and significant for the litigation 
prospects of claimants aggrieved by discrimination.200 Given that plaintiffs lose 
summary judgment approximately 80 percent of the time when they are unable 
to reference favorable intracircuit substantive law on the same-actor doctrine, 
these dismal outcomes suggest that, as the doctrine continues to transform, 
 
 196. See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313 (2010). 
 197. Professor Martin reviewed all appellate court opinions addressing the same-actor doctrine, 
published and unpublished, available on Westlaw. She also reviewed all federal district court opinions 
over the three-year period. She explicitly states that her goal in reviewing these cases was to identify 
various trends, including the stages at which the same-actor evidence proves most fatal and under what 
circumstances plaintiffs successfully overcome the inference. Id. at 370 n.247. 
 198. Professor Martin may have included cases applying the same-actor inference that arose 
under the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and alleged 
discrimination in the sale of a motor vehicle and unfair labor practices. See id. at 371. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See Moss, supra note 148 (suggesting that, when the scope of the same-actor inference 
clearly extends to the permutations described in Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2, the likelihood of summary 
judgment increases). 
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widen, and expand, it will result in an even larger swath of case dismissals at 
summary judgment. In addition, given case-selection effects, we believe that 
expansion of the same-actor doctrine poses an access-to-justice problem. 
Expansion widens the swath of claimants who are unable to access counsel. 
These claimants will, in turn, either drop out of the dispute pyramid when they 
are unable to access counsel or they will press on pro se. Throughout the 
litigation process, pro se claimants of discrimination fail at a far higher rate 
than counseled claimants.201 
While these prior studies depict the rate at which federal district courts 
grant summary judgment when the same-actor doctrine is adjudicated in Title 
VII cases, we sought to examine empirically the rate at which adjudication of 
the same-actor doctrine by federal district courts at summary judgment has 
grown over time given the evolving and ever-widening scope of the doctrine. 
Thus, we conducted a time-series analysis that examined the growth rate in 
application by federal district courts of the same-actor doctrine. 
In this regard, we had two primary hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that 
the expanding scope of the same-actor inference in Title VII cases would 
coincide with a rise in the growth rate in adjudication by federal district courts 
of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. Second, we hypothesized 
that, given the divergence among circuit courts in application of the strong-
inference standard, the growth rate of the doctrine would diverge across 
circuits. Primarily, we predicted that the growth rate of the same-actor doctrine 
would be highest within circuits that affirmatively require district courts to 
apply the “strong inference of nondiscrimination” standard at summary 
judgment, such as the Second Circuit. In contrast, the growth rate would be 
lower in circuits that merely allow courts to weigh same-actor evidence at 
summary judgment, such as the Sixth Circuit, or in circuits that have sharply 
curtailed the same-actor doctrine, such as the Seventh Circuit.202 
A. Method 
Our time-series analysis was designed to establish the percentage of 
federal district court summary judgment decisions affected by the same-actor 
doctrine in Title VII cases. As described in Part I.B.2, much of the “bite” of the 
same-actor doctrine operates at summary judgment, where the strong inference 
of nondiscrimination results in case dismissals.203 Rather than examining the 
 
 201. See Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment 
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (2005); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. 
Quintanilla, Access to Counsel: Psychological Science Can Improve the Promise of Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 95 (2014); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., 
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post 
Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188–89 (2010). 
 202. See supra Part I.A.3 and notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra Part I.A.3 and notes 170–71 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
56(a). 
2016] THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION 41 
smaller set of published circuit court decisions, our time-series analysis 
examined the larger set of federal district court summary judgment 
decisions.204 We employed a twenty-three-year time horizon, collecting all 
publicly available federal district court decisions adjudicating motions for 
summary judgment in Title VII cases from 1990 to 2013. We established the 
annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions affected by the same-
actor doctrine by compiling the frequency in which federal district courts 
invoked the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. We then used that 
number as the numerator and divided by the total number of summary 
judgment decisions in Title VII cases as the denominator. 
We first collected all publicly available cases over the twenty-three-year 
period from 1990 to 2013 in which federal district courts invoked the same-
actor doctrine in Title VII summary judgment decisions. These cases were 
retrieved using targeted searches on WestlawNext for both published and 
unpublished decisions.205 We next conducted a second, broader search 
designed to collect all publicly available cases over the twenty-three-year 
period in which federal district courts adjudicated Title VII claims at summary 
judgment. These cases were retrieved using broader, albeit targeted, searches 
on WestlawNext for both published and unpublished decisions.206 In arriving at 
the annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions affected by the 
same-actor doctrine from 1990 to 2013, we divided the frequency counts of the 
decisions collected under the first, targeted search by the frequency counts of 
the broader, targeted search of all district courts cases. Finally, to examine the 
annual percentage of total summary judgment decisions by federal district 
courts affected by the same-actor doctrine within each circuit court, we 
combined the decisions of federal district courts within each federal circuit and 
stratified the analysis by federal circuit.207 
We then conducted a time-series analysis that investigated the growth rate 
in the annual percentage of summary judgment adjudications affected by the 
 
 204. The study counted dispositive decisions by federal district courts and those of magistrate 
judges. The studies, however, did not count these decisions twice—for example, when both the 
magistrate judge decision and the federal district court decision were available and when the district 
court judge reviewed the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge. 
 205. The targeted search parameters for federal district court decisions adjudicating the same-
actor inference at summary judgment in Title VII cases was as follows: WL: advanced: ((Title /4 VII) 
“42 U.S.C. 2000” “Pub. L. 88-352” “42 USC 2000” “78 Stat. 241” & (employment & discrim!)) & 
((same /5 actor common /5 actor) & (infer! OR doct!)) & ((summary /3 judgment) OR (“Rule 56”) OR 
(FRCP /3 56) OR (F.R.C.P. /3 56)). 
 206. In order to circumvent the limited search result capacity of WestlawNext, the study first 
narrowed down federal district courts by state and then entered in search parameters tailored to a 
certain year. For example, when searching for the decisions adjudicating Title VII claims at summary 
judgment in Massachusetts in 1990, the search parameters were as follows: WL > Federal Materials > 
1st Circuit > Massachusetts Federal Court > advanced: (((Title /4 VII) “42 U.S.C. 2000” “Pub. L. 88-
352” “42 USC 2000” “78 Stat. 241” & (employment & discrim!)) & ((summary /3 judgment) OR 
(“Rule 56”) OR (FRCP /3 56) OR (F.R.C.P. /3 56))) & DA(aft 12-31-1989 & bef 01-01-1991). 
 207. The Tables are presented in the Appendix. 
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same-actor inference using an AutoRegressive-Integrated-Moving-Average 
(ARIMA) time-series method. One benefit of time series analysis is that it 
allows one to forecast future events based on past events. Moreover, an 
important benefit of the ARIMA method is that it allows one to forecast future 
percentages from past events while minimizing the temporal effect of 
autocorrelated data on the error terms and reducing the risk of Type I error. 
ARIMA modeling involves an iterative process to achieve a white noise series 
by taking into account noise parameters such as autoregressive and moving 
average terms.208 
In brief, the ARIMA method regards a time series as having three possible 
features: stationarity, autoregressiveness, and a moving average.209 First, the 
stationarity aspect of the model entails the extent to which the time series 
remains in equilibrium or stable around a constant mean level. Second, the 
autoregressive component signifies the degree to which an observation at one 
time point is predictable from prior observations, meaning that values above 
the long-run average tend to follow values above the average, and values below 
the long-run average tend to follow values below that average.210 For example, 
in a first-order autoregressive series, a time observation can be predicted from 
the observation immediately prior; therefore, the series may be regressed on 
itself one time point in the past. Finally, the moving average aspect of the 
model signifies whether the time series lags around a moving average (or 
random shocks) in the time series.211 These three parameters are often labeled 
p, d, and q, respectively, and expressed as ARIMA (p, d, q).212 Below, we 
provide our detailed statistical findings in the footnotes and place our narrative 
description of the results, along with the growth curves generated, in the body 
of the text. 
 
 208. Thor Norström, Deriving Relative Risks from Aggregate Data. 1. Theory, 42 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 333 (1988). 
 209. See GENE V. GLASS ET AL., DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF TIME-SERIES EXPERIMENTS 78 
(Info. Age Publ’g 2008) (1975). 
 210. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND 
FORECASTING 5 (2d ed. 2015). 
 211. See id. 
 212. ROBERT A. YAFFEE & MONNIE MCGEE, INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND 
FORECASTING WITH APPLICATIONS OF SAS AND SPSS (2000); Leslie J. McCain & Richard 
McCleary, The Statistical Analysis of the Simple Interrupted Time-Series Quasi-Experiment, in 
THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS 
ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 233 (1979). ARIMA models are defined by the parameters labeled p, d, 
and q, expressed as ARIMA (p, d, q). The number of autoregressive terms (p) specifies the extent to 
which prior values have an impact on time-series values, meaning that the data are autocorrelated. The 
number of nonseasonal differences (d) specifies whether and what type of adjustment is needed to 
achieve stationarity, whereby the mean value of the dependent variable remains constant over the 
entire time series. The number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation (q) specifies whether 
an adjustment is needed to account for lagged effects of random shocks in the time series. See Todd M. 
Wyatt et al., Population-Level Administration of AlcoholEdu for College: An ARIMA Time Series 
Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH COMM. 898 (2013). 
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B. Results 
This Section first presents the growth rate in the annual percentage of 
summary judgment decisions affected by the same-actor inference on a national 
basis and then turns to the growth rate in the annual percentage of such cases 
on a circuit-by-circuit court basis. 
1. Analysis 1: Has the Annual Percentage of Summary Judgment 
Decisions Affected by the Same-Actor Doctrine Grown? 
We first analyzed the degree to which federal district courts have 
increased application of the same-actor doctrine in Title VII cases at summary 
judgment. We theorized a rise in the annual rate of invocation of the same-actor 
doctrine given the doctrine’s evolution and ever-widening scope, discussed in 
Part I.B.1. 
As Table 1 in the Appendix reveals, the national frequency at which 
federal district courts adjudicate the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment 
in Title VII cases has increased annually from 1990 to 2013. Whereas from 
1990 to 1994 the same-actor inference doctrine was seldom invoked, from 
2000 to 2013 the annual frequency in application of the same-actor doctrine 
rose steadily to approximately sixty-four and sixty-three cases per annum in 
2012 and 2013, respectively. 
We then divided these frequency counts by the total number of summary 
judgment adjudications in Title VII cases to derive an annual percentage of 
summary judgment cases affected by the same-actor doctrine. We then 
employed these annual percentage figures to conduct a time-series analysis 
using an ARIMA model.213 The ARIMA time-series analysis revealed that the 
rising growth rate in the percentage of cases affected by the same-actor 
inference on a national basis is statistically significant.214 Moreover, the time-
series analysis, depicted in Figure 1, reveals that, all else being equal, the 
 
 213. An ARIMA analysis entails three stages: identify, estimate, and forecast, which 
correspond to the stages described by Box and Jenkins. See GEORGE E.P. BOX ET AL., TIME SERIES 
ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL (5th ed. 2015). In the identification stage, one identifies the 
response series and candidate ARIMA models so as to suggest one or more ARIMA models that may 
fit. In the estimation and diagnostic checking stage, one estimates the parameters of the model and 
produces diagnostic statistics to help judge the adequacy of the model. In the forecasting stage, one 
uses the model to forecast future values of the time series and to generate confidence intervals for 
these forecasts. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS IN USING 
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS ch. 18 (5th ed. 2007). 
 214. The time-series exhibited statistically significant time-dependent growth. An 
ARIMA(2,1,0) model fit using maximum likelihood and given by Yt = .000755 - 1.17Yt-1 - 0.723Yt-2 + 
Zt, Zt ~ WN(0, 5.145E-6) was found to best identify the trend as determined by using AIC. Adjusted 
R2 = .627, R2 = .668. The Box-Ljung Q statistic, which is distributed according to the chi-square 
distribution reveals that the residual autocorrelation for the specified ARIMA model was 
nonsignificant for more than 95 percent of lags (Lag 6: Box-Ljung Q = 2.0044, p = .9193; Lag 12: 
Box-Ljung Q = 6.52, p = .8878; Lag 18: Box-Ljung Q = 11.94, p = .85 ). 
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growth rate will continue to rise.215 The ARIMA model predicts that the annual 
percentage will increase from between 1.39 percent and 2.41 percent in 2015 to 
between 1.65 percent and 3.04 percent by 2020. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
NATIONAL GROWTH RATE OF DECISIONS AFFECTED  
BY THE SAME-ACTOR DOCTRINE 
2. Analysis 2: Does the Annual Rate of Decisions Affected by the Same-
Actor Doctrine Differ Across U.S. Courts of Appeals? 
We then analyzed the degree to which invocation of the same-actor 
doctrine in Title VII summary judgment decisions differs on a circuit-by-circuit 
basis. This time-series analysis examines the degree to which the growth rate in 
invocation of the same-actor doctrine differs between circuits. We theorized 
that the growth rate would differ, chiefly predicting that the growth rate would 
be highest in federal circuits that apply the strong inference of 
nondiscrimination standard. In contrast, we theorized that the growth rate 
would be lower in circuits that allow (rather than require) courts to apply same-
actor evidence at summary judgment, such as the Sixth Circuit, and lowest in 
 
 215. Prediction intervals for 2015 and 2020 are given by 1.39 percent and 2.41 percent, and 
1.65 percent and 3.04 percent, respectively. 
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circuits that have sharply curtailed the same-actor doctrine, such as the Seventh 
Circuit.216 
As Table 2 in the Appendix reveals, the frequency with which federal 
district courts invoke the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment differs 
markedly across circuits. Whereas the annual frequency has risen sharply in the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the frequency is much lower in other 
circuits, including the Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. The 
frequency in the Sixth Circuit lies between these two groups. 
Next, we divided these frequency counts by the total number of summary 
judgment adjudications in Title VII cases within each U.S. Court of Appeals to 
derive an annual percentage of summary judgment cases affected by the same-
actor doctrine by circuit.217 We then conducted ARIMA time-series analyses 
that contrasted the growth rate trends in three circuits: the Second, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits, revealed in Figure 2 below. 
 
FIGURE 2. 
GROWTH-RATE MODELS FOR THE SECOND, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS 
 
A. GROWTH-RATE PROJECTIONS IN SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
 216. See supra Part I.3 and notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
 217. Tables with both the frequency counts and base rates within each circuit are presented in 
the Appendix. 
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B. GROWTH-RATE PROJECTIONS IN SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
C. GROWTH-RATE PROJECTIONS IN SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
2016] THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION 47 
This ARIMA time-series analysis evidences that in Title VII cases 
adjudicated at summary judgment, the same-actor doctrine has been invoked at 
different rates across circuits and that the projected growth rate across circuits 
differs markedly. The projected difference in application across these three 
circuits is statistically significant. 
To begin, as Figure 2 depicts, all else being equal, the growth rate in the 
Second Circuit will continue to rise.218 The growth rate has risen sharply in the 
Second Circuit and is projected to increase further to between 3.26 percent and 
7.23 percent by 2020.219 This growth rate is theorized to represent the growth 
rate in federal circuits that apply the strong-inference-of-nondiscrimination 
standard. 
In contrast, the rate at which the same-actor doctrine has been invoked at 
summary judgment is lower in the Sixth Circuit, where the annual rate is 
expected to remain constant at 2.11 percent, and projected to remain between 
0.00 percent and 4.48 percent by 2020.220 Finally, the rate at which the same-
actor doctrine has been invoked at summary judgment is least in the Seventh 
Circuit, where the annual rate is expected to remain constant at .73 percent, and 
projected to remain between 0.00 percent and 1.72 percent by 2020.221 
As revealed, the differential growth rate across circuit courts coincides 
with the different jurisprudential implications of the same-actor doctrine across 
circuits and the rate at which these courts in these circuits develop new, wider, 
and broader permutations of the same-actor doctrine. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the projected doctrinal growth rate is highest in circuits that have 
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= 3.7567, p = .7096; Lag 12: Box-Ljung Q = 9.4681, p = .6625; Lag 18: Box-Ljung Q = 13.2621, p = 
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enacted the strong inference of nondiscrimination standard, such as the Second 
Circuit. The Second,222 Fourth,223 Fifth,224 and Ninth225 Circuits hold that the 
same-actor doctrine enacts a “strong inference” that the defendant did not 
engage in discrimination. These federal courts consider the same-actor 
inference very compelling,226 at times requiring claimants to come forward 
with “an extraordinarily strong showing of discrimination” to overcome the 
“strong inference” of nondiscrimination.227 
The analysis also reveals that the doctrinal growth rate in the Sixth Circuit 
is lower than the Second Circuit. The Sixth Circuit228 and Third Circuit229 have 
adopted a doctrinal position in the middle holding that the same-actor inference 
is not a mandatory presumption but rather evidence that a judge may consider 
at summary judgment. Under this approach, a federal court would be permitted 
to deploy the same-actor inference at summary judgment when dismissing the 
plaintiff’s case. 
Finally, the lowest doctrinal growth rate is found in the Seventh Circuit. 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have rejected application of the same-actor 
doctrine at summary judgment, equating the same-actor situation to potential 
evidence of nondiscrimination for the ultimate trier of fact to consider.230 These 
U.S. Courts of Appeals have concluded that “[t]he ‘common actor’ or ‘same-
actor’ inference is a reasonable inference that may be argued to the jury, but it 
is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of law.”231 
Together, these results reveal that the evolving and ever-widening 
boundary of the same-actor doctrine coincides with a national growth rate in 
invocation of the same-actor doctrine at summary judgment. Our time-series 
analysis predicts that, all else being equal, the doctrinal growth rate will 
continue to rise. Secondly, the results reveal that the doctrinal growth rate 
among the federal circuits that adopt the strong-inference standard is higher 
(and is predicted to continue rising) when compared to circuits that have 
narrowed the legal effect of the doctrine, or curtailed the same-actor doctrine, 
such as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Troublingly, the doctrinal growth rate 
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of the same-actor doctrine is projected to rise into the foreseeable future unless 
the doctrine is revisited and curtailed.232 
IV. 
RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE SAME-ACTOR DOCTRINE AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
In this Part we explore the implications of law and psychological science 
on the same-actor doctrine. In so doing, we join with scholars and jurists in the 
tradition of calling for accumulated knowledge in the field of psychological 
science to be harnessed when designing and evaluating jurisprudence, law, and 
public policy.233 Psychological science has long served as a basis for evaluating 
and improving law and public policy.234 Indeed, the exchange between law, 
justice, and science has deep roots in both early235 and more recent Western 
philosophy.236 As William James once wrote when elucidating philosophical 
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pragmatism, “Science and metaphysics would come much nearer together, 
would in fact work absolutely hand in hand. . . . Science and critical philosophy 
thus burst the bounds of common sense. With science [naïve] realism 
ceases.”237 More recently, Professors Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske 
eloquently called on scholars and jurists to consider psychological science 
when designing legal doctrine: “[A]s judges develop and elaborate substantive 
legal theories, they should guard against basing their analyses on inaccurate 
conceptions of relevant, real world phenomena.”238 They urged jurists, when 
elaborating substantive legal theories, to identify advances within the field of 
psychological science that offer an empirically supported account of human 
behavior, and to contrast these empirically supported accounts with folk 
accounts of human nature embedded within the law.239 Finally, President 
Obama has recently issued an executive order calling for psychological and 
behavior science to be used in designing government policies that better serve 
the American people.240  Along this vein, Part I and Part II of our Article reveal 
epistemic tension between the folk accounts of human behavior animating the 
same-actor inference and the accumulated knowledge in the psychological 
sciences. Given the widening boundary of the same-actor doctrine and the 
doctrine’s troubling growth depicted in Part III, there is pressing need to reflect 
 
a priori, armchair methods of the philosopher, and . . . require, instead, embedding in (or replacement 
by) suitable empirical theories.”); see also JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938); 
JAMES, supra note 233; W.V. QUINE, Naturalism; or, Living Within One’s Means, in QUINTESSENCE: 
BASIC READINGS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE 275 (Roger F. Gibson, Jr. ed., 2004). 
 237. JAMES, supra note 233, at 26, 82. 
 238. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1000. Krieger and Fiske advanced a jurisprudential 
approach known as behavioral realism. Id. The approach was introduced at a July 2006 symposium 
issue discussing how advances in social and cognitive psychology lend new perspective to 
jurisprudence under federal nondiscrimination laws and the Equal Protection Clause. In the 
symposium, jurists and social and cognitive psychologists produced several noteworthy articles: 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Krieger & 
Fiske, supra note 7; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Law: Reframing the Discussion 
About Social Science’s Place in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE, 
supra note 112, at 383. For additional discussions of behavioral realism, see, for example, Jerry Kang 
et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, 
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Jerry 
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2005); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit 
Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007). 
 239. Professor Jerry Kang has elaborated a three-step process for this form of inquiry. First, one 
identifies psychological science that provides an accurate model of human behavior and decision 
making; second, one examines the “common sense” accounts of human behavior and decision making 
embedded within law and legal jurisprudence; and third, one accounts for the gap—where the gap is 
large, we must pressure law to bridge that gap. See Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some 
Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627 (2015). 
 240. See Using Behavioral Sciences to Better Serve the American People, Exec. Order No. 
13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 54697 (signed Sep. 15, 2015) (“To more fully realize the benefits of behavioral 
insights and deliver better results at a lower cost for the American people, the Federal Government 
should design its policies and programs to reflect our best understanding of how people engage with, 
participate in, use, and respond to these policies and programs.”).  
2016] THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION 51 
critically on this interstitial doctrine and to examine how it can be readapted to 
remain consistent with scientific evidence in the psychological sciences.241 
We return to the implicit theories of human behavior embedded within the 
same-actor inference doctrine. As described in Part II, the same-actor doctrine 
has been troublingly justified on grounds of common sense and economic 
rationality. The common sense justification presupposes an implicit descriptive 
theory of human behavior, whereby a decision maker who dislikes members of 
a protected group incurs psychological costs by associating with them. This lay 
theory suggests that because people who hold biases against stereotyped groups 
experience dissonance when closely working with out-group members, these 
persons explicitly anticipate, consider, and avoid the dissonance by choosing 
not to hire members of stereotyped groups.242 Regarding economic rationality, 
the implicit behavioral theory behind this justification presupposes that, rather 
than hiring workers from a group one dislikes and firing them later, an 
economically efficient discriminator would refuse to hire stereotyped group 
members at all. Under this view, discrimination at termination cannot reflect 
how economically rational people actually behave and therefore, discrimination 
is unlikely in the everyday. 
A. Epistemological Tension Between the “Common Sense” 
Underpinnings of the Same-Actor Doctrine and Decades of 
Psychological Science on How Bias Manifests 
There is marked epistemological tension between the decades of 
accumulated psychological science on how stereotypes, prejudice, and 
discrimination operate against members of stereotyped groups and the lay 
psychological account animating the same-actor doctrine.243 The “common 
sense” explanation of the doctrine is predicated on the lay psychological theory 
that people who hold bias against members of stereotyped groups experience 
dissonance when working with them and, therefore, choose not to hire them. 
That is, this doctrine equates bias to “old-fashioned” prejudice, bias as the overt 
psychopathology of immoral and depraved bad actors—bias less frequently 
exhibited in society today. Given that the strong inference of nondiscrimination 
operates as a decisive defense, and licenses other forms of biased treatment, the 
doctrine is predicated on a folk account which presumes that Title VII prohibits 
only blatant, overt, and animus-laden discrimination. Yet, psychological 
science has shown that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination affect 
members of stigmatized groups far more pervasively than this account 
presumes. Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are the result of common 
psychological processes; and this bias is, in fact, pervasive against members of 
stigmatized groups. Indeed, most majority-group members in American society 
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hold implicit bias in favor of their own majority-group and against minority-
group members. Therefore, the pivotal question is not whether an actor holds 
bias, but rather whether the particular features of a context, situation, 
institution, or system are designed to curtail or cause the manifestation of 
implicit bias against members of stereotyped groups. Mainly, psychological 
science reveals that it is highly plausible for a person who holds bias against a 
member of a protected group to nonetheless hire a woman or minority, given 
the unique situational demands at the hiring stage, and later express disparate 
treatment against that same woman or minority at a subsequent employment 
stage. 
Dual process perspectives on prejudice posit that the expression of 
implicit bias occurs automatically, with little awareness, control, and 
intention.244 Implicit bias is likely to manifest when situations afford discretion 
and subjectivity because these contexts provide many potential reasons for a 
given decision, and individuals may believe that they are objective when, in 
fact, they are influenced by implicit biases and stereotypes.245 However, people 
can override bias with an egalitarian response when they are motivated to be 
unbiased. For example, when people are aware of their propensity to express 
implicit bias, they may allocate more attention to regulating their decisions so 
that they behave in a more egalitarian manner.246 Yet, even those who truly 
desire to behave unbiasedly may express bias when they are cognitively taxed 
(e.g., multitasking, performing a complex task, etc.) and cannot garner 
sufficient mental resources to override biased decision making. Importantly, 
rather than primarily relying on individuals to regulate their own biases, 
situations can be designed to reduce the potential for implicit bias to emerge. 
Typically, these situational interventions involve minimizing the subjectivity 
laden in decision making, effectively rooting out bias where it is most likely to 
operate unjustly. 
Dovidio and Gaertner, for example, conducted a laboratory experiment 
that examined reactions to black and white job applicants with very strong, 
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moderate, or very weak qualifications.247 When applicants’ qualifications were 
either very strong or very weak, black and white applicants were recommended 
as hires at equivalent rates. In these situations, the clarity of the candidate’s 
qualifications was so straightforward that there was little opportunity for 
subjective decision making. However, when applicants’ qualifications were 
moderate, white applicants were hired more frequently than black applicants.248 
Further, for white applicants, there was a jump in hiring recommendations from 
6 percent when they had low qualifications to 76 percent when they had 
moderate qualifications; that is, moderately qualified whites were hired three-
quarters of the time. In contrast, black applicants saw an increase from 13 
percent when they had low qualifications to 45 percent when they had 
moderate qualifications; that is, identically moderately qualified blacks were 
hired less than half of the time. When there was room for discretion and 
subjectivity (when black and white applicants had moderate qualifications), 
white applicants were given the benefit of the doubt, whereas black applicants 
were not. 
Similar discretionary contexts have yielded bias in experimental audit 
studies in labor markets. In a study of labor markets in Chicago and Boston, for 
example,249 Bertrand and Mullainathan sent identical resumes with either 
clearly white-sounding names (e.g., Greg Baker) or African American-
sounding names (e.g., Jamal Jones) in response to posted employment ads. The 
resumes were experimentally varied to be strong or weak. Overall, white 
applicants received 50 percent more callbacks than African Americans. Given 
that the only attribute to vary across resumes was the name of the applicants, 
this finding shows clear evidence of discrimination against black job 
applicants. Additionally, white applicants with stronger resumes received 30 
percent more callbacks than white applicants with weaker resumes. However, 
African American applicants with stronger resumes received only 9 percent 
more callbacks than African Americans with weaker resumes. This latter 
finding highlights that employers did not attend to strong qualifications in 
African Americans’ resumes, which is consistent with decades of laboratory 
research showing that stereotypes can prevent people from noticing counter-
stereotypical information (the same competence-related attribute is noticed 
when applied to Whites, but neglected when applied toward African 
Americans) and can cause them to reinterpret that information in a less 
favorable light (e.g., view the same information as diagnostic of competency 
for whites, but as nondiagnostic for African Americans). 
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Taken together, these and many other250 psychological studies establish 
that when situations afford subjectivity and discretion, that is, when decisions 
entail ambiguous criteria or performance credentials, implicit bias may operate, 
prompting members of majority groups to favor members of their own 
group.251 Decision makers do not perceive this in-group favoring as bias 
because the ambiguity in these contexts allows them to rationalize these 
decisions in ways that seem fair and impartial.252 These biases are subtle, and 
even well-intentioned people who make biased decisions may honestly 
convince themselves that their decisions were based on neutral and legitimate 
criteria rather than bias.253 This logic is incorrect given that the experimental 
studies in the lab and labor market are tightly controlled, meaning that the only 
possible reason for favoring a white applicant is the candidate’s racial group 
membership. 
The expression of implicit bias is not inevitable, however, and the second 
stage of dual process theories of social cognition addresses how implicit bias 
can be overcome and corrected. Indeed, this second stage of the dual process 
model is crucial for determining whether people will correct their decision 
making and halt the operation of bias. In this stage, individuals’ personal 
beliefs and motivations come into play. When people are motivated to be 
unbiased and have sufficient cognitive abilities to enact this motivation, they 
will consider their decision through the lens of egalitarian values and will 
behave without bias.254 This motivation to be unbiased can stem from 
differences in individuals’ internalized racial attitudes or from external sources. 
External sources of this egalitarian motivation include social norms about being 
unbiased or workplace procedures that create oversight and accountability, 
leading individuals to slow down their processing and make careful 
decisions.255 When situations enhance the motivation and ability to control 
bias, people can exert control over their own implicit bias, helping them make 
fair decisions. Stated another way, whether implicit bias will manifest against 
members of stigmatized groups will be situationally and contextually 
aggravated, influenced, or attenuated. Discrimination may be exacerbated or 
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inhibited depending on the conditions in a situation and context.256 Situations 
may constrain the relationship between prejudice and bias, and powerfully 
curtail the degree to which bias is expressed. 
One of the earliest social science studies on discrimination illuminates this 
“person x situation interaction” and underscores how unreasonable it is to infer 
that an actor who hires a member of a stereotyped group harbors no animosity 
toward that group.257 In this classic study, sociologist Richard LaPiere 
accompanied a Chinese couple to 251 hotels across the United States during the 
early 1930s. At each hotel, the group asked if they could be given a room or 
served a meal. Despite the marked anti-Chinese sentiment that characterized 
this time period in the United States, LaPiere and the couple were denied 
service only once. To investigate whether these positive behaviors represented 
a lack of bias toward the Chinese, LaPiere sent letters to these hotels six 
months after their visit asking if they would accept Chinese people in their 
establishments. In contrast to the positive reception received on actual visits, 92 
percent of the businesses replied that they would not serve the Chinese. 
Why would people who readily acknowledge their prejudice toward the 
Chinese actually fail to express behavior consistent with that prejudice in an 
actual interaction with Chinese guests? One reason for this disconnect between 
bias and behavior stemmed from the power of social situations in overriding 
dispositions and internally held attitudes. When the Chinese couple requested 
services, there was a strong situational norm to provide those services and to 
help potential patrons. Denying someone service requires publicly breaking 
service norms, something that many individuals find aversive and are reluctant 
to do. Thus, when the Chinese couple visited in person, the predominant norm 
to provide service may have been sufficiently powerful to override individuals’ 
attitudes toward the Chinese. In addition, LaPiere’s presence with his Chinese 
guests likely mitigated the expression of bias in situ. In short, the decision to 
allow the Chinese couple access in one instance had little bearing on the 
marked prejudice that these establishments harbored against this minority 
group. In the eight decades since, social scientists have systematically shown 
that situational factors can exacerbate or inhibit bias.258 
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Regarding the second stage of the dual-process model, a supervisor who 
must make an employment decision in a context in which egalitarian norms are 
salient and in which discretion is cabined may not engage in discrimination, 
even though the supervisor harbors bias toward minorities or women. The folk 
depiction presumes that a person who holds bias at the hiring stage will be 
motivated to act on that bias and will do so irrespective of any criteria, 
expectations, norms, and constraints that operate at the hiring stage. This 
“common sense” account that people who hold bias would not hire minorities 
or women is deeply mistaken. 
“Common sense” notwithstanding, it is not altogether inconceivable that 
an initial hiring decision may reflect the distinct possibility that a woman or 
minority was, in fact, the most highly qualified candidate. Indeed, despite bias 
against women in STEM, female computer programmers rank among the most 
celebrated scientists in the world, including Ada Lovelace (who is often 
regarded as the first computer programmer in the world), Grace Hooper (who is 
credited with helping to create the COBALT computer language and the word 
“debugging”), and Megan Smith (chief technology officer of the United 
States), among many others.259 Moreover, some workplaces may implement 
well-designed, formalized hiring criteria, leaving little discretion for 
supervisors to reject well-qualified women or minorities in the applicant pool. 
Further, despite harboring bias, HR managers may hire female or minority 
applicants to obtain the material, presentational benefits of diversity, which 
include signaling to clients, customers, prospective employees, and investors 
that the firm values diversity. Nancy Leong has powerfully argued that, at the 
hiring stage, firms may behave as if diversity is good business to obtain these 
signaling benefits.260 
Indeed, there are many cases that illustrate situations which prompted the 
hiring of women and minorities, regardless of potentially biased decision 
makers at the hiring stage. For example, an initial hiring decision may reflect 
an employer’s desire to have a position expeditiously filled due to a pressing 
 
Fiske, supra note 6; Monteith et al., supra note 246; Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of 
Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177 (2003). 
 259. Indeed, among the most powerful people in the world are women who lead Fortune 500 
technology companies, including Sheryl Sandberg (COO, Facebook), Safra Catz (Co-CEO, Oracle), 
Marissa Mayer (CEO and President, Yahoo), Susan Wojcicki (CEO, YouTube, Google), Ruth Porat 
(SVP and CFO, Google & Alphabet), Bridget Van Kralingen (SVP, IBM Global Business Services, 
IBM), and Diane Bryant (SVP & General Manager, Data Center Group, Intel).  See Kristen Bellstrone 
et. al., Fortune’s 50 Most Powerful Women List 2015, 172 FORTUNE MAG. 90 (2015). Further, many 
brilliant female computer programmers who began careers at Google now lead start-up companies in 
Silicon Valley: Claire Hughes Johnson (COO, Stripe), Francoise Casals Brougher (Global Suiness 
Lead, Square), Stacy Brown-Philpot (COO, TaskRabbit), Katie Stanton (VP Global Media, Twitter), 
Natalie Fair (Head of Finance, Pinterest), Sukhinder Singh Cassidy (CEO, Joyus), April Underwood 
(Head of Platform, Slack), and Amy Chang (CEO, Accompany). See Patricia Sellers, The Google 
Effect, 172 FORTUNE MAG. 110 (2015).      
 260. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
2016] THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE OF NONDISCRIMINATION 57 
need in the short term by a skilled employee.261 When the exigent need passes, 
an employer may later fire the skilled claimant and fill the position with a 
majority-group member whom the employer favors.262 Further, a workplace 
may have a strong organizational norm about rehiring employees on renewable 
annual contracts. As such, a manager may rehire an employee due to this 
organizational norm but later fire that employee based on bias. Indeed, in the 
latter scenario, an employer who desires to discriminate may face less 
resistance in firing than refusing to rehire the employee.263 Moreover, a high-
level manager may be technically responsible for both hiring and firing 
employees, yet substantive decisions may be made by low-level managers, with 
the high-level manager largely accepting the recommendation of subordinates. 
In this scenario, the high-level manager’s behavior reflects bureaucratic 
compartmentalization, with the substantive recommendations below tainted by 
bias.264 Finally, federal courts have extended the “hiring” prerequisite to 
scenarios in which a supervisor provides an employee an average, rather than a 
poor, review. Similarly, there are many reasons why a supervisor may provide 
an employee an average review, rather than a poor review. The average review 
might in fact reflect the employee’s actual performance on the job.265 These 
examples, and countless more, underscore the incompleteness of the lay theory 
that when employers hire members of stereotyped groups they must necessarily 
like them and hold no bias toward them. 
Finally, female and minority applicants may successfully circumnavigate 
the effect of stereotypes at the hiring stage; they may successfully self-present a 
less racially salient or a less stereotypical working identity to avoid stereotypes, 
such as by “resume whitening,” a phenomenon that Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati, among others, have explored.266 While bias against these employees 
may be less acute at the hiring stage, prejudice may emerge against them at 
later stages of the employment relationship when employment difficulties 
arise.267 Here, Carbado and Gulati’s scholarship has revealed that bias is not 
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evenly distributed among all members of a stereotyped group.268 There is far-
ranging variability among the psychological, physical, and social dimensions 
within minority groups,269 and an individual’s experience with discrimination 
will vary considerably as a function of where they reside on the spectrum of 
these within-category features. For example, African Americans with more 
phenotypic stereotypic features (e.g., darker skin tone, wider noses, fuller lips) 
are more likely to be stereotyped and subjected to bias in both the lab and 
field.270 Racial minorities who are more highly identified with their racial 
group (those whose racial group membership is central to their self-concept) 
are more likely to experience discrimination compared to minorities who are 
less racially identified.271 For example, social psychological experiments have 
demonstrated that strongly identified racial minorities (e.g., those who 
mentioned belonging to a racial affinity group) were evaluated more negatively 
by whites compared to identically portrayed minorities who did not express 
their racial identification (e.g., those who mentioned belonging to a social 
group unrelated to their racial background).272 While minorities may self-
present to avoid bias at the hiring stage, prejudice may emerge against them 
after entering the workplace. As Linda Krieger has noted, “Intergroup bias does 
not function as a stable trait or preference that expresses consistently across all 
situations.”273 
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In the end, this “common sense” account is too simplistic and incomplete 
to support legitimate legal doctrine that has material consequences on those 
who experience discrimination. Indeed, there are countless internal and 
external reasons for hiring a woman or a minority that have no bearing on 
whether one “likes” or “dislikes” protected groups. 
B. Epistemological Tension Between the “Economic Rationality” 
Underpinnings and Psychological Science on Moral Licensing 
The same-actor doctrine has also been justified on grounds of economic 
rationality. This implicit theory has two strands. In the first, an employer 
engages in economically irrational conduct when terminating an employee for 
discriminatory reasons. Therefore, it would be exceedingly unlikely for an 
employer to discriminate when firing an employee. After all, the transaction 
costs required to hire and train a new employee would disincentivize arbitrary 
discrimination in the workplace. Under this view, after hiring a female or 
minority employee, a rational employer would not terminate that female or 
minority employee for discriminatory reasons. This economic rationality 
argument, therefore, bridges from an implicit normative theory of behavior 
(economic rationality) to the implicit descriptive behavioral theory that 
employers, as a matter of fact, do not engage in workplace discrimination. In 
the second strand, because the marginal cost of discrimination increases at later 
stages in an employment relationship (e.g., rehiring and retraining), a rational 
racist (or sexist) would discriminate at hiring rather than at later employment 
stages. Both strands underpin the belief that discrimination against women and 
minorities within American workplaces is extremely unlikely. To be sure, there 
are many flaws with these arguments, and the theory animating this concern is 
not new. Indeed, these arguments were quite en vogue in the 1960s and have 
been contested ever since.274 Psychological science conducted over the past 
two decades underscores additional reasons to discredit the economic 
irrationality underpinnings of the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination. 
To begin, even if discrimination should be irrational as a normative 
matter, decades of behavioral economics have demonstrated that people 
systematically vary from the idealized accounts of economically rational 
decision making. Humans are boundedly rational: they may behave in 
economically rational ways in some contexts, but they systematically and 
routinely act irrationally across many contexts as a result of heuristics, 
stereotypes, biases, and prejudices. There are systematic pitfalls and 
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shortcomings in social judgment.275 As such, whether employers, in fact, 
engage in workplace discrimination is a descriptive empirical question, one that 
need not be deduced a priori from normative theories about how rational actors 
ought to behave under idealized conditions.276 
On this score, the descriptive theory of homoeconomicus fails to connect 
with the pervasive, accumulated evidence of discrimination against members of 
stereotyped groups in the current American workplace. While actors should 
behave as if discrimination is economically irrational, within American 
workplaces discrimination nevertheless persists. Troublingly, recent social 
psychological research has evidenced that between 20 percent and 40 percent 
of employers discriminate against members of a legally protected class.277 
Further, a study of the American public revealed that, from 1997 to 2001, 18 
percent to 21 percent of African Americans reported that they were 
discriminated against at their place of work within the last thirty days.278 In this 
study, “[31 percent of blacks and Hispanics] reported being ‘passed over for a 
promotion which went to a white [employee]’ because of racial 
discrimination.”279 Indeed, African Americans and Hispanics with higher levels 
of education reported experiencing higher levels of discrimination compared to 
other respondents.280 Further, within the United States, gender- and race-based 
income inequities persist.281 Female wage earners have an average salary of 
$33,900 per year, whereas males average $47,700 per year.282 African 
American households earn an average salary of $22,500 less per year than 
white households, while Latino households earn about $16,500 less than 
whites.283 Moreover, rates of unemployment are more than twice as high for 
African Americans relative to whites, and unemployment rates are significantly 
higher for Latinos compared to whites.284 
Further, psychological science reveals the error of presupposing that 
actors avoid discrimination by making economically rational decisions. As 
discussed in Part I.B and Part IV.A, bias against women and minorities 
operates in less blatant ways than theorized especially when decision makers 
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use subjective and ambiguous criteria, or when decision makers fail to exert the 
effort necessary to reach egalitarian decisions. Further, psychological science 
on moral licensing reveals the error of presuming that the psychology of hiring 
applicants is necessarily equivalent to an employer’s behavior toward 
employees within the workplace. Studies on moral licensing reveal the hazard 
that a firing decision following a hiring decision stems from bias. The act of 
hiring a black candidate, even an exceptionally qualified one, as was the case in 
the Monin and Miller (2001) experiment,285 can result in subsequent racially 
biased decision making toward the same and other black candidates. A 
supervisor who feels licensed as egalitarian and nonprejudiced (because he or 
she hired the first black employee) may decide to fire or discipline the same or 
another black employee for an action (e.g., inadequate performance, negative 
interpersonal behavior, tardiness), but choose not to similarly fire or discipline 
a white employee who engages in the same action. Indeed, it is well established 
that supervisors provide more second chances to in-group members than out-
group members.286 
Research on moral licensing also reveals that the psychology behind 
hiring and firing decisions differs because these decisions are made on a case-
by-case basis: when an individual employee’s actions are considered in 
isolation, rather than in direct comparison to other employees. For example, 
when considering the scenario involving the firing of Jason, the manager, 
Mike, weighed the seriousness of Jason’s actions and decided whether they 
were sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Mike was not comparing Jason’s 
actions to similar actions of others and determining which is worse; rather 
Jason’s actions were considered in isolation. In these situations, managers have 
greater discretion to conclude that a given action requires disciplinary action or 
dismissal. This discretion can result in the manifestation of implicit bias against 
minorities who experience greater punishment than nonminorities although 
they both are engaging in similar negative actions.287 Indeed, it is much more 
difficult to recognize the operation of discriminatory animus in a case-by-case 
decision as compared to pool-based decision making.288 Thus, the moral 
licensing effect of hiring a black employee may increase the likelihood that a 
supervisor will make adverse decisions against that black employee, other 
black employees, or other members of stigmatized groups. At the same time, a 
supervisor may convince themselves and others that these disparities stem from 
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rational reasons. In sum, well-intentioned people, even people who have made 
a decision that favors a black employee, are susceptible to engaging in biased 
decision making when they have discretion to justify their behavior in unbiased 
ways.289 
Case law reveals many instances where bias operates after an employee is 
hired. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Zema articulated, there are 
many reasons why someone who holds animus toward a protected group may 
nonetheless hire a minority-group member. For example, a manager might hire 
a person of a certain race expecting not to have frequent contact with them 
given their respective positions within the company. Or an employer might hire 
an employee of a certain gender expecting that person to act, or dress, or talk in 
a way the employer deems acceptable for that gender but then fire that 
employee if he or she fails to comply with the employer’s gender-based 
stereotypes.290 Similarly, if an employee were the first African American hired, 
an employer might be unaware of his or her own stereotypical views of African 
Americans at the time of hiring. 
Moreover, social scientists have demonstrated many circumstances in 
which employers behave as if discrimination is economically rational.291 
Sociological evidence reveals that employers discriminate against employees 
who fail to assimilate, including employees who exhibit a racially salient 
working identity in the workplace.292 For example, employers rationalize their 
actions as economically necessary given the sensibilities of customers or 
employees.293 In addition, employers often assign female and minority 
employees more onerous or less prestigious assignments that lend less potential 
for advancement.294 In so doing, employers rationalize the allocation of scarce 
opportunities (or less prestigious assignments) by the need to invest in 
employees with the most leadership potential. Sociological evidence also 
reveals that employers often discriminate against women who become 
pregnant295 and employees who fail to conform to normative schemas, 
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stereotypes, and scripts about how women296 or members of stereotyped groups 
should present themselves in the workplace.297 Employers have rationalized 
discrimination against women and minorities as necessary to preserve the 
employer’s corporate image.298 Finally, employers have rationalized 
discrimination against women who complain of masculine cultures in computer 
programming workplaces.299 
Returning to our first hypothetical involving Betty who sought a 
promotion, if initial hiring decisions reflect a lack of bias, then one would 
anticipate that, all else being equal, women would climb the corporate ladder at 
rates commensurate with men. The well-documented dearth of women in top-
level positions in all types of organizations, however, suggests that something 
along the career pathway impedes women from advancing as quickly and 
successfully as men.300 This top-level gender imbalance is undoubtedly multi-
determined, with factors including disparate motherhood disadvantaging 
women’s ascent. Even so, aside from motherhood penalties, discrimination 
against women also hinders their advancement. Compared to men, women are 
less likely to be thought of as leaders, further slowing their ascent up the 
ladder.301 Further, when women display the behaviors people expect of leaders, 
such as self-promotion, their efforts are met with resistance and backlash, and 
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they are perceived as pushy, bossy, and unkind—all attributes that are not 
attributed to men who engage in the same self-promotional behaviors.302 
This extensive body of social-psychological research documenting 
barriers to women’s ascent of the corporate ladder is relevant to understanding 
the same-actor doctrine. When women are initially hired, they are hired on the 
basis of whether their current skills fit a given position. As they build their 
careers within an organization, however, they increasingly target higher 
positions that demand greater leadership skills and agentic traits, characteristics 
stereotypically viewed as more characteristic of men than of women.303 This 
gendered context characterizing promotion and advancement opens the door 
for managerial subjectivity and discretion and can unleash bias against women. 
They may be disproportionately passed over because they do not “seem like 
leaders,” or because they are perceived as “too difficult” when they engage in 
behaviors that facilitate advancement. These stereotype-driven perceptions will 
become more salient and relevant the longer a woman stays in a position, 
showing how the delayed ascent of the corporate ladder may occur to women 
even though they were initially viewed as strong fits for a less agentic position. 
In other words, as work demands change in a given workplace context, so too 
do opportunities for the expression of implicit bias. 
Finally, we turn to the second strand of the economic rationality doctrine: 
the theory that an economically rational racist (or sexist) individual would 
discriminate at the hiring stage rather than at later stages of the employment 
relationship given the higher marginal costs of discrimination. This theory is 
troubled on its own terms for two reasons. First, focusing exclusively on 
marginal costs, the theory fails to consider marginal benefits, even to actors 
with a “taste for discrimination,” by hiring women and minorities into a 
workplace—a diversity premium. Because female and minority hires diversify 
 
 302. Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Feminized Management and Backlash Toward Agentic 
Women: The Hidden Costs to Women of a Kinder, Gentler Image of Middle Managers, 77 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1004 (1999); Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to 
Counterstereotypic Behavior: The Role of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype Maintenance, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 157 (2004); Laurie A. Rudman et al., Status Incongruity and 
Backlash Effects: Defending the Gender Hierarchy Motivates Prejudice Against Female Leaders, 48 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (2012). 
 303. Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske have reasoned that disparate treatment doctrine 
incorporates the descriptive behavioral theory that biased decision makers discriminate consistently 
across contexts. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, at 1042. As both they and we have argued, the 
context in which a decision maker chooses to hire a woman is markedly different from the context in 
which a decision maker chooses to promote that woman to a leadership position. These contexts entail 
different norms, different kinds of information, different experiences with the employee, different 
criteria, and different schemas, scripts, and stereotypes applicable to the employee to be hired or 
promoted. As a result, a biased decision maker will likely discriminate differentially across contexts. 
See Kaiser & Wilkins, supra note 8, at 462, 465 (“[S]trongly identified group members are more likely 
to be the recipients of prejudice and discrimination than weakly identified group members. . . . In 
situations in which majorities and minorities have frequent contact with each other, majority group 
members can use behavioral observations to draw inferences about identification.”). 
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the workplace, these marginal benefits operate primarily at the hiring stage. 
Second, the theory assumes that there are economically rational racist (and 
sexist) individuals in American workplaces who seek to cost-benefit maximize 
their “taste for discrimination.” The chief difficulty is that for these actors the 
doctrine modifies the ex-ante default rule and creates a license to discriminate 
against female and minority employees whom they have hired. For these 
actors, the doctrine reduces the effectiveness of discrimination claims by 
members of protected groups—a meaningful deterrent. The license, therefore, 
reduces the marginal cost of discrimination at later stages of the employment 
relationship. As such, bias against women and minorities becomes more 
economically rational, which is a troubling implication, especially if one 
presupposes that managers with “a taste for discrimination” lurk in American 
workplaces.304 
C. Closing the Circuit Split on the Same-Actor Inference 
Having called into question the epistemological tension between the lay 
theories animating the same-actor doctrine and the vast psychological science 
available to jurists and scholars, we now turn to closing the circuit split on the 
same-actor inference.305 
To begin, the same-actor inference is not codified in any federal civil 
rights statute. That is, no federal court has squared the same-actor doctrine with 
the text of Title VII itself or the legislative history of federal civil rights 
enactments. Instead, the same-actor doctrine is an interstitial doctrine, first 
invented by the Fourth Circuit, and since adopted by other circuits into the 
evidentiary framework for disparate treatment claims. Indeed, the only positive 
law supporting the same-actor inference is, in effect, the weight of prior 
elaboration of the doctrine without congressional support. Because there is no 
legitimate textual or purposive justification for the doctrine, courts have largely 
relied on common sense and economic rationality to predicate the doctrine.306 
 
 304. As described in Part I.B, supra, we caution that psychological science on stereotyping, 
prejudice, and discrimination reveals that bias does not operate in this blatant manner. Nevertheless, 
we have chosen to expose the flaws of the economic rationality theory on its own terms. 
 305. In short, the flawed doctrine has been contrasted against, and shown to be manifestly 
inconsistent with, wide bodies of empirical inquiry in the fields of psychology and sociology. This gap 
between theory and empirical reality poses a problem, one prompting the need for critical reflection 
and adaptation of the doctrine. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME 
OLD WAYS OF THINKING (Cosmo Inc. 2008) (1907).  
 306. We have found one explanation that has attempted to square the same-actor doctrine with 
the purpose of federal antidiscrimination law. In Proud v. Stone, Judge Wilkinson explained that the 
same-actor inference of nondiscrimination advances the aim of the statute by incentivizing the hiring 
of qualified minority and female applicants because the doctrine blocks any future claims of 
employment discrimination. See 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991). That is, the doctrine has been 
justified on the lay theory that without the defensive-liability shield of the same-actor doctrine, 
employers would not hire women and minorities, or members of protected groups. This argument is 
quite obviously and shamefully flawed. As we have described in Part IV.A, supra, there are many 
legitimate reasons why employers choose to hire women, such as when women are the most highly 
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As we have revealed at length, both of these implicit descriptive accounts are 
empirically false. Further, insofar as the doctrine limits Title VII’s reach to 
blatant animus by “old-fashioned” racists, the doctrine impermissibly abrogates 
the central purpose of Title VII, which was congressionally enacted to eradicate 
discriminatory behavior within the employment sector of the U.S. economy.307 
The same-actor doctrine has operated as a judicial heuristic swiftly 
filtering out disparate treatment claims at summary judgment. The doctrine 
implicitly presumes that this filter largely screens out meritless cases. However, 
as the moral credentialing literature reveals, there is a hazard that firing a 
member of a protected class after hiring likely resulted from bias. As such, the 
judicially enacted filter is poorly engineered, screening out false negatives of 
potentially meritorious cases. At summary judgment, the dismissal rate for 
same-actor doctrine cases is 80 percent, and the scope of the doctrine is 
broadening in circuits that have adopted the strong inference of 
nondiscrimination standard.308 Part III suggests that organizations have 
responded to the moral credential and legal license by altering employment 
structures to harness this defense, widening and broadening applicability of the 
strong inference of nondiscrimination itself. In short, the judicial screen is 
manifestly unjust on its own terms and pernicious—forming a legal license 
that, like a vicious cycle, feeds back on itself to further erode the remedial 
scheme that Congress enacted. 
Given the lack of textual support for the doctrine and its lack of a neutral 
and legitimate basis, as well as the psychological science amassed that 
powerfully reveals the errors laden within the doctrine, we recommend that 
federal courts resolve the circuit court split by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach, most recently elaborated by Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton in 
Perez v. Thorntons, Inc.309 In that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
although same-actor evidence may be argued to the jury, it was not a 
 
qualified applicants. One need only compare and contrast across circuits (some of which adopt the 
strong inference of nondiscrimination, like the Second Circuit, and others that do not, like the Seventh 
Circuit) to discern that the same-actor inference of nondiscrimination is not necessary to ensure that 
women and minorities are hired into American workplaces. The doctrine, moreover, creates a legal 
license to disparately treat qualified minority and female candidates who have joined the workplace, 
affecting the potential for promotion and persistence in the workplace.     
 307. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2521 (2015). When creating the same-actor doctrine, the Fourth Circuit selected one of many 
doctrinal possibilities to resolve the doctrinal ambiguity and indeterminacy within Title VII 
jurisprudence. Bell, supra note 10, at 367; Crenshaw, supra note 9 at 1341–46. Unfortunately, the 
Fourth Circuit’s doctrinal choice subordinates the experiences of members of stereotyped groups. Mari 
J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. 
LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (“[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a 
special voice to which we should listen.”).  
 308. See supra Part I.B.1 & Fig.2. 
 309. Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013); see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 7, 
at 1046; Martin, supra note 133, at 1168–70; Martin, supra note 196, at 360 n.206; Moss, supra note 
148, at 73. 
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conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of law.310 Instead, this evidence 
is “for the trier of fact to consider.”311 Similarly, in Johnson v. Zema, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the employer and deemed the same-actor inference inappropriate. The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that, “[T]he same-actor inference is not itself 
evidence of nondiscrimination. It simply provides a convenient shorthand for 
cases in which a plaintiff is unable to present sufficient evidence of 
discrimination.”312 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that  
the same-actor inference is unlikely to be dispositive in very many cases. 
In fact, we have found no case in this or any other Circuit in which a 
plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence to prove an improper motive 
was able to produce sufficient evidence to otherwise sustain his burden on 
summary judgment and yet was foreclosed from the possibility of relief 
by the same-actor inference.313  
In a subsequent decision, Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., the Seventh 
Circuit reiterated that it had “emphatically rejected the ‘same-actor inference’ 
in the race-discrimination setting in Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., . . . and 
our conclusion there applies with equal force to proof of age discrimination.”314 
Further, U.S. Courts of Appeals that have yet to consider the continuing 
viability of the same-actor doctrine should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach. In so doing, these courts would ensure that the burden-shifting 
framework at summary judgment and trial remains consistent with the 
psychological science that has accumulated over the past several decades. 
Those courts that have applied the same-actor inference should revisit their 
jurisprudence and adopt the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence recently elaborated 
in Perez v. Thorntons, Inc.315 Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court sees fit to 
examine the circuit split on the issue, the Court should consider the robust 
psychological evidence that supports abrogating the inference. 
In sum, we recommend that federal courts draw on the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach by narrowing the doctrine and essentially discontinue applying the 
doctrine at all stages of the federal litigation process: the pleading stage, 
summary judgment, and trial. When the same-actor hires and takes an adverse 
action against a member of a protected group, an employer may argue that 
hiring the claimant is evidence of nondiscrimination. Whether this same-actor 
 
 310. Perez, 731 F.3d at 709 (citing Blasdel v. Nw. Univ., 687 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 311. Id. (quoting Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 312. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
However, in at least two subsequent decisions, one of which was overruled, the court seemed to signal 
the continued viability of the same-actor inference within the Seventh Circuit. See Keri v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 648 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 
(7th Cir. 2013); Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 F. App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 315. Perez, 731 F.3d at 699. 
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evidence is convincing should be for the trier of fact to weigh along with all 
other evidence. The same-actor doctrine should no longer trigger an inference 
that raises the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden at the pleading stage, summary 
judgment, or trial. The issue is fundamentally an evidentiary matter for the jury 
to resolve. Moreover, scholars and jurists should continue to study how best to 
inform juries, when relevant, about the vast knowledge accumulated in the field 
of psychological science to guide juries in evidence-based decision making.316 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have demonstrated the profound epistemological 
tension between the lay psychological theories animating the same-actor 
doctrine and decades of psychological science on prejudice, implicit bias, 
aversive racism, moral credentials, and moral licensing. The same-actor 
inference, though nominally justified on the grounds of common sense and 
economic rationality, simply fails on those ostensible bases. The doctrine is 
inconsistent with the best science available in the field of psychological 
science. As such, this interstitial creation must be curtailed. No legitimate, 
neutral, nondiscriminatory policy sufficiently justifies the doctrine. Given the 
dearth of both textual support and legislative history supporting the same-actor 
doctrine, federal courts should reflect and reevaluate the interstitial doctrine. 
Same-actor evidence is fundamentally for the trier of fact along with all other 
potential evidence of discrimination. 
As such, we return where we began, with the two instances of employees 
who challenge their employer’s conduct as discriminatory. We revisit these 
hypotheticals to explore how their grievances would fare in light of our 
recommendation. 
In the first hypothetical, Betty is a female computer programmer who 
works for a technology company in Silicon Valley. Betty applied for a 
promotion to a supervisory position, but Mike ultimately chose not to promote 
her. Instead, Mike promoted Carl as a supervisor under the assumption that 
Carl would be a better leader of computer programmers, despite being less 
qualified than Betty. In this first example, if a federal court applies the same-
actor doctrine, the court would apply a strong inference of nondiscrimination at 
summary judgment and require Betty to provide powerful direct evidence of 
discrimination. In contrast, our recommendation would be that the same-actor 
 
 316. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury 
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2012); Sara Gordon, 
What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve 
Decisionmaking, 81 TENN. L. REV. 751 (2014); Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The 
Promise of a Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174 
(2010); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007); Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments: 
Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 629 (2000). 
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doctrine should not apply. Instead, the fact that Mike was the manager who 
both hired and failed to promote Betty would be circumstantial evidence that 
the technology company could offer as evidence of a lack of discriminatory 
intent against women before the jury. On this evidence, a jury may find Betty’s 
employer not liable after deliberating. However, there would be no mandatory 
inference, presumption, or heightening of the evidentiary burden foisted on 
Betty at summary judgment. Mike’s status as the manager who both hired 
Betty and failed to promote her is simply one evidentiary datum in the entire 
context of the situation that Betty challenges as an unlawful failure to promote. 
The trier of fact would grapple with whether the technology company 
unlawfully imposed a glass ceiling on Betty, a female computer programmer. 
In the second hypothetical, Jason is an African American unloader for a 
logistics company in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Mike hired Jason three years ago. 
Although Jason complained to Mike about Dan’s disparate write-ups, rather 
than investigating Jason’s complaint, Mike fired Jason after several incident 
reports. Applying the same-actor doctrine, a court would apply a strong 
inference of nondiscrimination, requiring Jason to combat this inference of 
nondiscrimination with direct evidence of bias. In contrast, our 
recommendation would be that the same-actor doctrine should not apply. 
Again, the fact that Mike was the manager who both hired and fired Jason 
would be circumstantial evidence of nondiscrimination. That is, the jury could 
decide to draw on this circumstantial evidence if it wishes to do so. There 
would be, however, no heightening of the evidentiary requirement on Jason at 
summary judgment. Again, Mike’s role as the same supervisor who hired and 
fired Jason would be one evidentiary data point in the entire fabric of the 
chronology leading to Jason’s claim of unlawful termination. 
In this Article, we have introduced a body of psychological science that 
speaks directly to how prejudice and discrimination operate in modern 
American workplaces. An important finding in this body of research is the 
psychological phenomena of moral credentialing and moral licensing.317 
People feel more comfortable acting in ethically questionable ways when they 
can point to evidence that previously demonstrated a lack of prejudice.318 After 
making a decision that favors a member of a stereotyped group, such as by 
hiring or promoting an applicant (even if that employee was eminently 
qualified to be hired or promoted), a subsequent decision about a member of a 
stereotyped group is more likely to result in the manifestation of bias. When 
making the subsequent decision, people are less likely to self-monitor to ensure 
that they act in egalitarian and unbiased ways. Troublingly, the same-actor 
 
 317. See Merritt et al., supra note 32; Miller & Effron, supra note 32. 
 318. See Bradley-Geist et al., Moral Credentialing, supra note 33; Effron et al., supra note 20; 
Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads, supra note 33; Effron, supra note 33; Mann & Kawakami, supra 
note 33; Monin & Miller, supra note 22. 
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doctrine materially reinforces and reifies this psychological license into a legal 
license to engage in bias. 
In conclusion, the assumptions of human nature embedded within the 
same-actor doctrine are contrary to psychological science. The same-actor 
inference presupposes that the same-actor who hires and takes adverse action 
against a member of a stereotyped group is bias free. Yet, psychological 
science reveals the error of this flawed account of human nature. Federal courts 
must remain cautious and vigilant about the possibility of bias in the same-
actor context. Indeed, circuit courts that apply the strong inference of 
nondiscrimination at summary judgment have the matter scientifically in 
reverse and have created a manifestly unjust, and behaviorally unrealistic, 
judicial heuristic. In curtailing the same-actor doctrine, the Seventh Circuit has 
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 TABLE 2 
ALL U.S. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS CATEGORIZED BY U.S. COURT OF APPEALS CIRCUIT, REFERENCING THE  
SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE DOCTRINE IN TITLE VII CASES AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
Circuit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1st 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2nd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 8 9 5 7 13 8 12 10 12 17 21 14 14 11 
3rd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 3 3 
4th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 2 2 3 3 4 1 6 11 
5th 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 4 5 7 2 1 6 7 7 10 4 6 10 13 10 15 
6th 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 1 1 2 3 1 7 5 8 6 9 5 6 9 7 
7th 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 2 3 4 3 1 0 2 2 5 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 
8th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 3 1 1 2 2 0 
9th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 11 13 6 14 13 6 14 11 
10th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 3 1 3 4 3 
11th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 3 0 2 1 0 3 1 3 3 1 0 0 
D.C.  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 






 TABLE 3  
ALL U.S. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS CATEGORIZED BY COURT OF APPEALS CIRCUIT, ADJUDICATING TITLE VII CASES AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
Circuit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1st 16 16 16 18 33 35 48 46 46 60 43 56 59 61 60 102 70 91 70 104 102 96 101 86 
2nd 93 88 101 107 113 161 224 292 307 304 330 262 293 273 312 386 408 419 385 456 376 435 450 411 
3rd 64 56 74 73 97 104 119 146 124 139 131 151 129 108 163 216 269 322 354 308 343 248 254 286 
4th 25 26 37 48 61 84 94 74 65 94 127 119 156 94 130 150 261 222 212 271 348 354 435 399 
5th 31 29 35 45 62 87 130 190 182 189 172 188 163 167 186 305 377 323 306 314 359 377 339 336 
6th 38 37 41 31 53 35 68 62 83 63 69 98 100 105 56 177 389 394 345 285 372 337 336 355 
7th 117 111 93 117 161 235 249 293 300 248 313 313 314 272 280 289 397 337 282 303 304 339 425 323 
8th 10 25 20 33 34 41 65 60 57 54 64 84 91 105 109 189 261 277 188 209 160 152 133 127 
9th 22 21 40 50 50 84 64 60 79 70 73 88 59 54 99 147 283 301 284 286 324 338 299 325 
10th 47 69 75 58 88 81 94 105 108 84 87 73 80 68 86 126 199 173 150 157 178 170 173 175 
11th 38 28 29 37 56 84 97 108 107 123 125 88 88 79 67 187 309 313 279 232 246 255 332 366 
D.C. 28 31 26 23 24 32 37 41 34 22 29 20 44 55 60 128 115 107 120 133 116 118 117 135 







 TABLE 4  
NUMERATOR/DENOMINATOR RATIO OF U.S. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS, CATEGORIZED BY U.S. COURT OF APPEALS CIRCUIT,  
REFERENCING THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE DOCTRINE IN TITLE VII CASES AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
Circuit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1st 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.012 
2nd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.024 0.034 0.017 0.026 0.042 0.021 0.029 0.024 0.031 0.037 0.056 0.032 0.031 0.027 
3rd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.010 
4th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.014 0.028 
5th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.016 0.011 0.021 0.029 0.037 0.012 0.006 0.032 0.023 0.019 0.031 0.013 0.019 0.028 0.034 0.029 0.045 
6th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.048 0.000 0.032 0.014 0.010 0.020 0.029 0.018 0.040 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.032 0.013 0.018 0.027 0.020 
7th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.016 0.009 0.002 0.003 
8th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.015 0.000 
9th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.010 0.014 0.039 0.043 0.021 0.049 0.040 0.018 0.047 0.034 
10th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.023 0.007 0.019 0.006 0.018 0.023 0.017 
11th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.034 0.000 0.030 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.000 
D.C. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.019 
 
 
 
